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ABSTRACT: This article deals with the legal status of postoperative transsexuals in terms of marriage
and sex-based classifications. Until recently, sex has been assumed to be binary, i.e., male and female.
Whether sex is immutable or transitory, objective or subjective, has now become an international concern.
This article addresses every case in the world every decided on this issue. The resolution is centrally
important to the battle over marriage and sex0based classifications.
The thesis of this article is that sex is an immutable characteristic at the time of birth and must be
determined by objective criteria.
Sex must be determined by objective factors such as biology and physiology. A person’s sex is determined
by chromosomes. When there is harmony between biology and physiology, surgery cannot alter a person’s
sex merely because that person desires a different gender. If sex is primarily a state of mind and based on
subjective mental desires, equal protection for sex-based classifications becomes meaningless. To maintain
any stability and meaning to sex-based classification, sex must (and can) be determined by objective
factors.
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TRANSSEXUALISM AND THE BINARY DIVIDE: DETERMINING SEX USING
OBJECTIVE RATHER THAN SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA

By
Mathew D. Staver1

In 1965, when Jewell Akens debuted the hit song, The Birds and the Bees, the
American pop culture gave no second thought to the lyric “a girl and a guy.”
Differentiating between a man and a woman, and the natural attraction to the opposite
sex, seemed simple enough. However, in 1969, Johns Hopkins University opened the
nation’s first clinic to perform so-called sex reassignment surgery (hereinafter “SRS”) on
males wanting to be females and females wanting to be males.2 When a follow-up study
of transsexuals treated by the clinic severally criticized the legitimacy of SRS,3 the
program was immediately shut down, and other university-sponsored clinics followed
suit like dominos.4 Now, due to the emergence of private clinics performing SRS, a

1

Mathew D. Staver, B.A. 1980, Southern Missionary College, M.A. 1982, Andrews University, J.D. 1987,
University of Kentucky, LL.D. 2006 (honoris causa), Liberty University, is Founder and Chairman of
Liberty Counsel, a public interest litigation, education and policy organization. He is also Interim Dean and
Professor of Law of Liberty University School of Law, and is Vice President of Law and Policy for Liberty
University. Staver was lead counsel on the internationally publicized case known as Kantaras v. Kantaras,
884 So.2d 155 (Fla. App.) reh’g denied (2004), review denied (Fla. 2005), which dealt with the
determination of a person’s sex for purposes of marriage.
2
Richard Green & John Money, TRANSSEXUALISM & SEX REASSIGNMENT (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1969).
3
See Jon K. Meyer, M.D. et al., Sex Reassignment: Follow-up, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1015 (1979).
Dr. Meyer served as the Director of the Gender Identity Clinic and Chair of the Gender Identity Committee
at Johns Hopkins University, where he developed his research interests in gender and sexual identities. In
June 2004, Dr. Meyer was elected to a two-year term as president of the American Psychoanalytic
Association.
4
Ellen
Makkai,
The
Sex-Change
Charade,
available
at
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30442 (last visited June 29, 2006); see also
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debate has emerged over whether postoperative transsexuals should legally be classified
as their desired sex or their birth sex for purposes of marriage.5
The legal status of postoperative transsexuals for purposes of marriage is an
extremely important issue for both marriage and sex-based classifications. If sex can be
changed like clothes, then law defining marriage or granting protected status on account
of sex will become meaningless. In addressing the legal status of postoperative
transsexuals, section I of this article will begin by addressing the longstanding marriage
laws in the United States which sanctions marriage only between one man and one
woman. Section II will then discuss in some detail the medical issues involving sex and
sexual disorders, and will also discuss whether sex should be defined biologically or
psychologically for purposes of marriage.
I.

THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized traditional male-female

marriage as “the foundation of the family and society, without which there would be

Garrett Oppenheim, Hopkins Policy on Sex Change in Fog After Follow-Up Study, 11 TRANSITION
(July/August/September 1979).
5
The words “sex” and “gender” will be used interchangeably to mean the same thing. Some transsexual
advocates have attempted to differentiate between the two, arguing that “sex” refers more to biology and
physiology and “gender” refers to the expression of maleness or femaleness. See e.g., Julie A. Greenberg,
Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A Comparison of the Multiracial and Transgendered
Experience, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917 (2002); Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Man a Man, and When is a
Woman a Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 725 (2000); Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female:
Intersexuality and the Collision Between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1999); Mary Coombs,
Sexual Disorientation: Transgendered People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 22728 (1998); Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of
Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995). See also Rebecca Moskow, Broader Legal Implications
of Transsexual Sex Determination Cases, U. CIN. L. REV. 1421 (2003). Such a distinction lacks merits. See
David Lee Mundy, Hitting Below the Belt: Sexploitive Ideology and the Disaggregation of Sex and Gender,
14 REGENT U. L. REV. 215 (2001); Teresa A. Zakaria, By Any Other Name: Defining Male and Female in
Marriage Statutes, 3 Ave Maria L. Rev. 349 (2005).
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neither civilization nor progress.”6

Justice Holmes observed that “some form of

permanent association between the sexes” is one of the rudimentary characteristics of
civilization.7 The “structure of society itself largely depends upon the institution of
marriage [which is founded upon the] joining of the man and woman....”8 In “every
enlightened government”, marriage “is pre-eminently the basis of civil institutions, and
thus an object of the deepest public concern.”
A.

The Laws Of The Several States Recognize Only Traditional Marriage.
No state has legislatively authorized same-sex marriage.9 In addition to the general

laws and longstanding public policy of the states and territories banning same-sex
marriage, 41 states since 1996 have enacted specific Defense of Marriage Acts
(hereinafter “DOMA”), expressly limiting marriage to one man and one woman.10

6

Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888). The Supreme Court has said that “no legislation can be
supposed more wholesome and necessary in the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to
take rank as one of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which seeks to establish it on the basis of
the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the union for life of one man and one woman in
the holy estate of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best
guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political
improvement.” Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885).
7
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 (1918).
8
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
9
On November 18, 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court became the first court to sanction
same-sex marriage. This decision was implemented 180 days later on May 17, 2004. See Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
10
Ala. Code § 30-1-19; Alaska Stat. § 25.05.013; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 25-101; Ark. Code § 9-11-107, 109 and
208; Cal. Fam. Code § 308.5; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-104; Del. Code tit. 13 § 101; Fla. Stat. § 741.212; Ga.
Code § 19-3-3.1; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1, 1-3 and 1.6; Idaho Code § 32-209; 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/212
and 5/213.1; Ind. Code § 31-11-1-1; Iowa Code § 595.2; Kan. Stat. § 23-101; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 402.020,
040 and 045; La. Civ. Code Art. 86, 89, and 3520; La. Rev. Stat. § 9:272, 273 and 275; Me. Rev. Stat. tit.
19-A § 701; Md. Code Fam. § 2-201; Mich. Comp. Laws § 555.1 and .271; Minn. Stat. § 517.01 and .03;
Miss. Code § 93-1.1; Mo. Ann. Stat. Const. art. § 33; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.022; Mont. Code § 40-1-401;
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 457:1-2; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2; N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-01; Ohio Rev. Code §
3101.01; Okla. Stat. tit. 43 § 3.1; 23 Pa. Const. Stat. § 1102 and 1704; S.C. Code § 20-1-15; S.D. Codified
Laws § 25-1-1and 1-38; Tenn. Code § 36-3-113; Tex. Fam. Code § 2.001; Utah Code § 30-1-2; Va. Code §
20-45.2; Vt. Stat. 15 § 8; Wash. Rev. Code § 26.04.010 and 020; W. Va. Code § 48-2-104 and 603; Wis.
Stat. § 300; and Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-101. No state legislatively recognizes same-sex marriage. The legislative
schemes of the remaining states not listed above also limit marriage to one man and one woman. In 1996,
states began passing Defense of Marriage Acts, which expressly ban same-sex marriage. In addition, some
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Hawaii in 1998 amended its constitution to provide that marriage is the sole province of
the legislative branch.11 Referenda by Alaska (1998), Hawaii (1998), Nebraska (2000),
Nevada (2002), Missouri (2004), Louisiana (2004), Oregon (2004), Kentucky (2004),
Michigan (2004), Mississippi (2004), Georgia (2004), North Dakota (2004), Ohio (2004),
Oklahoma (2004), Arkansas (2004), Montana (2004), Utah (2004), Kansas (2005), Texas
(2005), and Alabama (2006) banned same-sex marriage.12 Although Vermont does not
have a so-called DOMA, its statutory scheme limits marriage to one man and one
woman.13 Several statutes only focus on incestuous marriages.14 A few merely discuss

of the above states have also amended their constitutions to ban same-sex marriage, while other states have
constitutional bans on same-sex marriage without a corresponding statutory ban. An example of such a
state is Nebraska. See Neb. Const. art. I, § 29.
11
See Haw. Const. art. 1, § 23. The referendum was in response to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision
which stated that a ban on same-sex marriage must survive strict scrutiny under the Hawaii constitution.
See Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, reconsideration
granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993). Following the referendum, the legislature declared that
marriage is limited to one man and one woman. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1 (marriage is “only between a
man and a woman”).
12
See Alaska Const. art. 1 § 25; Haw. Const. Art. 1 § 23; Neb. Const. art. I, § 29; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 21;
Mo. Ann. Stat. Const. art. § 33; La. Const. art. 12 § 15; Or. Const. art. XV § 5a; Ky. Const. § 233A; Mich.
Const. art. 1, § 25; Miss. Const. Art. 14, § 263A; Ga. Const. art. I, § 4, P I; N.D. Const. art. II, § 28; Ohio
Const. art. XV, § 11; Okla. Const. art. II, 35; Ark. Const. Amend. 83 § 1; Mont. Const. Art. XIII § 7; Utah
Const. art. I, § 29; Kan. Const. XV § 16; Tex. Const. art. I, § 32 and Ala. Code § 30-1-19(b). The Alaska
referendum was in response to the state court’s decision in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL
88743 (Super. Ct. Alaska), which held that a restriction on marriage must survive strict scrutiny under the
Alaska constitution. The constitutional amendment overruled the Brause decision. In six states, Florida,
Georgia, Tennessee, Louisiana, Arizona, and Colorado, courts have held that proposed constitutional
amendments defining marriage as “one man and one woman” do not violate the single-subject rule.
Although not ruling on the single-subject rule, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the state
may proceed with a constitutional amendment defining marriage as “one man and one woman,” even if it
requires overruling a decision by the state’s highest court. See Schulman v. Attorney General, 447 Mass.
189 (2006).
13
Vermont statutes provide for “civil marriage” for opposite-sex partners and “civil unions” for same-sex
partners. The statutes expressly state that a “civil union” is not a “civil marriage.” See Vt. Stat. tit. 15 § 8;
Vt. Stat. tit. 15 § 1201(4) (The civil union law specifically states that while “a system of civil unions does
not bestow the status of civil marriage, it does satisfy the requirements of the Common Benefits Clause
[under the Vermont Constitution].” Vt. H.B. §1(1)(10) (2000)).
14
See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-21 and 25; Mass. Gen. Laws 207 § 1-2; N.J. Stat. §37:1-1; N.M. Stat. §
40-1-1; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 5; Ohio Rev. Code § 3101.01; Or. Rev. Stat. § 106.010 and 020; R.I. Gen.
Laws § 15-1-1.

Page - 6

marriage in general terms as a relationship between husband and wife or male and
female.15
In addition to the overwhelming statutory authority, a number of state courts, even
in the absence of an express statute, have rejected same-sex marriage.16 In 2004, a Florida

15

See Wis. Stat. § 765.01 (husband and wife); Wyo. Stat. § 20-1-101 (male and female).
See e.g., Alabama: In re: H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (“homosexual conduct of a parent –
conduct involving a sexual relationship between two persons of the same gender – creates a strong
presumption of unfitness that alone is sufficient justification for denying that parent custody of his or her
own children or prohibiting the adoption of the children of others”) (Moore, J. concurring); Alaska: Brause,
1998 WL 88743 (overruled by constitutional amendment); Arizona: Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel
County of Maricopa, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. App. 2003); Arkansas: May v. Daniels, 2004 WL 2250882 (Ark.);
California: Smelt v. County of Orange, California, 447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Colorado: Adams v.
Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982) (male America citizen and male
Australian alien who had been ceremonially “married” by a minister in Colorado does not qualify alien as
citizen’s spouse); Connecticut: Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. granted in
part but dismissing case as moot upon death of the party, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002) (a Vermont civil
union is not “marriage” recognized under this state because the union was not entered into between one
man and one woman); Kerrigan v. State, 2006 WL 2089468 (Conn. Super. 2006); Delaware: no cases;
District of Columbia: Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (marriage statute prohibited
clerk from issuing license to same-sex couple and same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right protected
by the Due Process Clause); Florida: Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 759, 760 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2001), rev. denied, 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2002) (classifications based on sex are not subject to strict
scrutiny, noting that the Constitution Revision Commission refused to add the term “sex” to the Florida
constitution so as to avoid any possibility that Florida courts might conclude the provision required
recognition of same-sex marriages); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. App.) reh’g denied (2004),
review denied (Fla. 2005), (rejecting transsexual marriage based on Florida DOMA which bans same-sex
marriage); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Georgia: Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47
(Ga. App.), reconsideration denied, cert. denied (2002) (a Vermont civil union is not marriage, and even if
it were, Georgia would not recognize it as such, because the state authorizes only the union of one man and
one woman and prohibits same-sex marriage); Hawaii: Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), aff’d,
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (authorizing strict scrutiny for marriage classifications but decision was
overruled by constitutional referendum); Idaho: no cases; Illinois: In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 206
(Ill. App. 1998) (challenge to statute proscribing same-sex marriage was moot and petitioner was never
legally married – “We cannot retroactively redefine petitioner and Hall’s relationship as a lawful marriage
or even confer the benefits of a legal marriage upon the relationship. If we did, we would essentially be
resurrecting common law marriage . . .”; Indiana: Morrison v. Sadler, 2003 WL 23119998 (Ind. Super. Ct.),
cert. denied, (dismissing challenge to Indiana’s DOMA which limits marriage to one man and one woman);
Iowa: no cases; Kansas: In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002) (a post-operative male-tofemale transsexual is not a woman within the meaning of the statutes recognizing marriage, and thus a
marriage of a male-to-female transsexual to another male is void); Kentucky: Jones v. Hallahan, 501
S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (a same-sex union is not recognized as marriage); Louisiana: no cases; Maine; no
cases; Maryland: no cases; Massachusetts: Albano v. Attorney General, 769 N.E.2d 1242 (Mass. 2002)
(initiative for constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage permissible); Goodrich v. Department
of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (first court to sanction same-sex marriage);
Michigan: no cases; Minnesota: Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186, 187 (Minn. 1971) (upholding
statute which authorizes marriage between persons of the same sex, stating “The institution of marriage as a
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is as
16

Page - 7

court of appeals voided the “marriage” of a postoperative transsexual.17 The Kansas
Supreme Court in 2002 also voided the “marriage” of a man with a male-to-female
transsexual.18 Viewing “the issue in this appeal to be one of law and not of fact” and
noting that the “fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
legislature governs”, the court invalidated the transsexual “marriage.”19

old as the book of Genesis” and recognizing “there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based
merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”); Mississippi: no cases; Missouri:
no cases; Montana: no cases; Nebraska: Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 2006 WL 1933417 (8th
Cir. 2006), ; Nevada: no cases; New Hampshire: no cases; New Jersey: M.T. v. J.T. 355 A.2d 204 (N.J.
App. 1976) (male transsexual who underwent sex-reassignment surgery may not be considered female for
marital purposes); In re Bacharach, 780 A.2d 579 (N.J. App. 2001) (change of name to include last name
of same-sex partner was not for an inappropriate purpose); New Mexico: no cases; New York: Anonymous
v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y App. Div. 1971) (a marriage between two males was a nullity
notwithstanding that “husband” believed “wife” was a female at the time of the ceremony, and
notwithstanding that “she” had subsequent sex surgery); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996) (“same-sex marriage . . . is not presently recognized under the laws of any state of the Union”,
the “long tradition of marriage, understood as the union of male and female, testifies to a contrary political,
cultural, religious and legal consensus [opposed to same-sex marriage] concluding that New York does not
recognize or authorize same-sex marriage and that the City Clerk correctly refused to issue the license.”);
In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 688 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) (“the state has a compelling interest in
fostering the traditional institution of marriage ( whether based on self-preservation, procreation, or
nurturing and keeping alive the concept of marriage and family as a basic fabric of our society), as old and
as fundamental as our entire civilization, which institution is deeply rooted and long established in firm and
rich societal values” and thus same-sex marriage is not authorized); Hebel v. West, 803 N.Y.S. 2d 242
(N.Y.A.D. 2005); Hernandez v. Robles, Samuels v. New York, Kane v. Marsolais and, Seymour v. Holcomb
(consolidated) 2006 WL 1835429 (N.Y. 2006) North Carolina: no cases; North Dakota: no cases; Ohio: In
re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002) (cohabiting same-sex partner of biological mother was not a
“parent”); In re Nash, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App.) (refusing to recognize transsexual marriage based
on statute that authorizes only opposite-sex marriage); In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Probate Court 1987)
(“There is no authority in Ohio for the issuance of a marriage license to consummate a marriage between a
post-operative male-to-female transsexual person and a male person”); Oklahoma: no cases; Oregon: Li v.
Oregon, 110 P.3d 91 (Or. 2005); Pennsylvania: De Santo v. Barnsly, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(two persons of the same sex cannot contract a common-law marriage); Rhode Island: no cases; South
Carolina: no cases; South Dakota: no cases; Tennessee: no cases; Texas: Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223
(Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 870 (2000) (ceremonial “marriage” between a man and a
transsexual born as a man, who was surgically and chemically altered to have the physical characteristics of
a woman, is not valid); Utah: no cases; Vermont: Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (holding that
while the Vermont constitution requires that same-sex couples be afforded the same benefits of traditional
marriage, the constitution does not require the state to issue a same-sex marriage license); Virginia: no
cases; Washington: Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. App. 1974) (statutory prohibition of samesex marriage does not violate state constitution); Anderson v. King County and Castle v. State of
Washington (consolidated for decision), 2004 WL 1738447 (Wash. Super. 2004).
17
Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155.
18
See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 120.
19
Id. at 135.
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Rejecting same-sex marriage, a Kentucky court noted that marriage “was a
custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that purpose,” noting that
“marriage has always been considered as the union of a man and a woman. . . .”20 The
Minnesota Supreme Court found that its statute, which bans same-sex marriage, did not
offend the First, Eighth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, holding that “there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based
merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”21 A New York
court noted that the state “law makes no provision for a ‘marriage’ between persons of
the same sex. Marriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman.”22
“Accordingly, the court declares that the so-called marriage ceremony in which the
plaintiff and defendant took part . . . did not in fact or in law create a marriage contract in
that the plaintiff and defendant are not and have not ever been ‘husband and wife’ or
parties to a valid marriage.”23
A Texas court refused to recognize the “marriage” of a man and a transsexual
born as a man who surgically and chemically altered his physical characteristics to that of
a woman.24 Rejecting the transsexual’s claim to a marriage license, the court noted that in
“our system of government it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine
what guidelines should govern the recognition of marriages involving transsexuals.”25
“[T]his court has no authority to fashion a new law on transsexuals, or anything else. We
cannot make law when no law exists: we can only interpret the written word of our sister
20

Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 589.
Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
22
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d at 500.
23
Id. at 501.
24
See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 223.
21
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branch of government, the legislature.”26 The court therefore held “as a matter of law,
that Christie Littleton is a male. As a male, Christie cannot be married to another male.”27
An Ohio court similarly denied the issuance of a marriage license to a transsexual.28
Noting that the marriage license law required that an applicant should not misrepresent
any of the facts required for the license, the court observed the following: It is axiomatic
that if a license is inadvertently issued where there has been a material misrepresentation
of factual information, such as sex, marital status, or age, then such license would be
void.29
A Washington court found that marriage was permissible only between one man
and one woman.30 The court held that the same-sex couple was “not being denied entry
into the marriage relationship because of their sex; rather, they are being denied entry
into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition of that relationship as
one which may be entered into only by two persons who are members of the opposite
sex.”31 Refusing to allow same-sex couples to marry is not based upon their same-sex
status, but rather it is based upon the state’s recognition that our society as a whole views
marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of
children. This is true even though married couples are not required to become parents
even though some couples are incapable of becoming parents and even though not all
couples who produce children are married. These, however, are exceptional situations.
25

Id. at 230.
Id.
27
Id. at 231.
28
See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d at 828. The holding in Ladrach was reaffirmed by another Ohio court in
2003. See In re Nash, 2003 WL 23097095.
29
Id. at 831. The applicant was refused a marriage license after advising the clerk that “she” had been
married two previous times to females.
30
See Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191.
31
Id. at 1192.
26
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The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal institution primarily because of
societal values associated with the propagation of the human race.32
Therefore, defining “marriage to exclude homosexual or any other same-sex
relationships is not to create an inherently suspect legislative classification . . .”33
Although some may contend that “other cultures may have fostered differing definitions
of marriage, marriage in this state, as elsewhere in the nation, has been deemed a private
relationship of a man and a woman (husband and wife) which involves ‘interests of basic
importance to our society.’”34 “[T]he state has exclusive dominion over the legal
institution of marriage [and the] societal values which are involved in this area must be
left to the examination of the legislature. . . .[Indeed, traditional] “marriage is now
defined as deeply rooted in our society.”35
B.

The Federal Defense Of Marriage Act Recognizes The States’ Interest
In Traditional Male-Female Marriage.
In response to the failed attempt in Hawaii to judicially recognize same-sex

marriage, Congress passed what is known as the Federal Defense of Marriage Act.36 The
Federal DOMA is designed to permit each state to set its own marriage policy and thus is
designed to afford a state the right to refuse full faith and credit to any out-of-state samesex union. Effective September 21, 1996, the law reads as follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall
be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding
of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
32

Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1196.
34
Id. at 1173 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971)).
35
Id.
36
See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense
of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998) (hereafter "Original Understanding").
33
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between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or right or claim
arising from such relationship.37
“Congress was intended to have broad power to create statutes like DOMA under the
Effects Clause” of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.38 The Full Faith and Credit Clause in
Article IV, Section 1, of the United States Constitution, states the following: Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial
Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the
Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the effects
thereof.39
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Constitution gives the Congress the
power to determine the “effects” of an act, record, or judicial proceeding of another state.
During the Constitutional Convention the “effects clause” became the subject of
controversy. The issue was whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause would include the
power to govern the effects not only of state court judgments, but also of the legislative
acts of the states.40 Justice Joseph Story noted in his commentary that the “effects” are
“expressly subjected to the legislative power.”41
The First Congress enacted the Full Faith and Credit Act to “prescribe the mode
in which the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings in each State, shall be
authenticated so as to take effect in every other state.”42 Today the Full Faith and Credit

37

28 U.S.C. §1738C.
Whitten, Original Understanding, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 392.
39
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
40
See Max Farrand ed., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 488 (1911) (statement of
William Samuel Johnson, September 3, 1787).
41
Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 661 (1833) (Ronald D.
Rotunda & John E. Nowak, eds. 1987).
42
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
38
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Act remains essentially unchanged and states the following: “Such Acts, Records and
judicial Proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they
have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they
are taken.”43
Pursuant to authority granted by the Constitution to determine the “effects” of
acts, records, or judicial proceedings in another state, Congress passed the Federal
DOMA.
Prima facie, every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own
statutes, lawfully enacted. One who challenges that right, because of the
force given to a conflicting statute or another state by the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, assumes the burden of showing, upon some rational basis,
that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are
superior to those of the forum. It follows that not every statute of another
state will override a conflicting statute of the forum by virtue of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. . . .44
One commentator stated that the historical evidence “makes it clear that the first sentence
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be interpreted to contain broad choice of
law commands to the states.”45 Professor Whitten argues that “the evidence is compelling
that Congress was intended to have broad power to create statutes like DOMA under the
Effects Clause” and the historical evidence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause indicates

43

28 U.S.C. §1738.
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 294 U.S. 323, 547-48. See also Sun Oil Co.
v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel one state to substitute
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with subject matter within which it is competent to
legislate); Jordan Herman, The Fusion of Gay Rights and Feminism: Gender Identity and Marriage After
Baehr v. Lewin, 56 OHIO STATE L. REV. 985, 991 n.25 (1995) (observing that in family law questions the
United States Supreme Court seems to balance the forum state's public policy interests against the interests
of comity).
45
Whitten, Original Understanding, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 392.
44
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that DOMA may not even be necessary, but is certainly within Congress's authority.46 In
Baker v. General Motors Corp.,47 “the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality as well as the continuing vitality of the public policy doctrine and choice
of law.”48 Indeed, the Supreme Court stated that the “Full Faith and Credit Clause does
not compel ‘a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
with the subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.’”49 Professor
Hogue, commenting on Georgia law, stated that “[h]omosexual unions will likely be held
violative of the state's public policy...”50 Recognizing that a number of states have
adopted statutes prohibiting the recognition of same-sex unions, Professor Hogue noted
that these “statutes will control in states which have them. In instances in which a state
lacks a statute, the common law (through the public-policy exception) will continue to
supply the appropriate rule.”51 The Supreme Court in Williams v. North Carolina,52
noted that the “necessary accommodation between the right of one State to safeguard its
interest in the family relation of its own people and the power of another state to grant
divorces [or recognize marriage] can be left to neither State.”53
Professor Hogue correctly notes that in “states which have adopted [same-sex]
anti-recognition statutes,” the state courts will lack jurisdiction to adjudicate rights arising
as a result of or in connection with out-of-state same-sex unions.54 Professor Lynn

46

Id.
522 U.S. 222 (1998).
48
L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex “Marriage”: How Will
States Enforce the Public Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 30 (1998).
49
Baker, 522 U.S. at 232 (quotation and citations omitted).
50
Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 30.
51
Id. at 36-37.
52
325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945) (“Williams II”).
53
Id. at 232.
54
Hogue, State Common-Law Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. at 42-43.
47
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Wardle, who testified before Congress during the adoption of the Federal DOMA, stated
the following:
There is no serious doubt that Congress has the power to enact legislation
defining the “effect” of one state's laws, records and judgments in other
states. Sentence two of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution (Article IV, 1) explicitly provides that: “The Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” The Congressional
Research Service of the Library of Congress has stated: Congress has the
power under the Clause to decree the effect that the statutes of one State
shall have in other States.” A host of scholarly authority for many decades
concurs with this assessment.55
Congress has a “substantial interest” in “balancing the interests” of the several states by
preventing one state's policy from dictating what the legal policy of other states will be.56
Even Professor Mark Strasser, who is an advocate of same-sex marriage, has conceded
the following:
Both the First and Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws suggest that a
marriage which would be treated as void in the domicile at the time of the
marriage need not be recognized, notwithstanding its being valid in the
state of celebration. Section 132(d) of the Restatement (First) of Conflict
of Laws suggests that a “marriage which is against the law of the state of
domicile of either party, though the requirements of the law of the state of
celebration have been complied with, will be invalid everywhere” if it
involves a “marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicile
makes void even though celebrated in another state.” The Second
Restatement suggests a similar policy, as a marriage need not be
recognized if “it violates the strong public policy of ... [the] state which
had the most significant relationship to the spouses in the marriage at the
time of the marriage.”57
The Supreme Court has explained that “marriages not polygamous or incestuous, or
otherwise declared void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the State where entered
55

Lynn D. Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage
Recognition, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 223 (1998).
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into, be recognized as valid in every other jurisdiction.”58 One state does not have to
recognize an out-of-state same-sex union or same-sex marriage recognized by another
jurisdiction if (1) the out-of-state union is contrary to the state's public policy or (2) the
out-of-state union is prohibited by the domicile state's statute and the domicile state has
the jurisdiction to enact its own legislation on the matter.
The Federal DOMA evinces a strong nationwide policy of promoting marriage
between one man and one woman. The longstanding public policy from the founding of
this country to the present has restricted marriage to only one man and one woman. The
Federal DOMA is designed to protect state sovereignty with respect to setting marriage
policy by allowing states to refuse recognition to any out-of-state same-sex union. The
real question the courts must now address is what constitutes a man and a woman for
purposes of marriage? The methodology used in answering this question must focus on
objective, rather than subjective criteria.
II.

SEX FOR PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE MUST BE DETERMINED BY
OBJECTIVE

BIOLOGICAL

RATHER

THAN

SUBJECTIVE

PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERIA.
A.

Sex Is An Immutable Characteristic Determined At The Time Of Birth.
When “sex” was established as a suspect classification under the Fourteenth

Amendment, the Supreme Court anchored the class to the crucial similarity that it shares
with race and national origin: immutability and determination at birth. In Frontiero v.
Richardson,59 the Court explained:
56

See United States v. Edgebroad Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
Mark Strasser, DOMA and the Two Faces of Federalism, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 457, 464 (1998).
58
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934).
59
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
57
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[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special
disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex
would seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . .”60
“Gender, like race, is a highly visible and immutable characteristic....”61 “Sex” is
“the one acknowledged immutable difference between men and women. . . .”62 If one
could change sex like changing clothes, every law designed to protect against sex
discrimination becomes pointless. In the eyes of the law, sex, like race, is and must be
immutable and fixed at birth.
B.

Sex Must Be Determined By Objective Criteria.
As with race and national origin, the law recognizes that a person’s sex is

immutable and therefore it must be determined by objective rather than subjective
criteria. Rene Descartes’ famous saying, “I think, therefore I am”, cannot mean that a
person legally becomes who they think they are. The law cannot condone a fill-in-the-

60

Id. at 686. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (same) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
61
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (emphasis added).
62
City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power, 435 U.S. 702, 727 (1978) (Burger, J., Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The “capacity to become pregnant is the inherited and
immutable characteristic that ‘primarily differentiates the female from the male.’” Bray v. Alexandria
Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 330 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also Michael M. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 466, 471 (1981) (upholding California statutory rape law and agreeing with
“the immutable physiological fact that it is the female exclusively who can become pregnant.”); Kahn v.
Shevin, 426 U.S. 351, 359, (1974) (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., dissenting) (sex, like alienage or national
origin is “immutable”); Frandsen v. County of Brevard, 800 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review
denied, 828 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 2002) (“Physical differences between men and women, however, are
enduring”). See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (close relatives “do not exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics”); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442
(1985) (mentally disabled are “immutably” different); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (children of
illegal aliens have no control over their status, unlike their parents); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505
(1976) (illegitimacy is like race or national origin because the status is not within the control of the
illegitimate person). See also Dean v. District of Columbia, 656 A.2d 307, 349-40 (D.C. 1995) (rejecting
Equal Protection challenge to law prohibiting same-sex marriage, stating characteristic of suspect class
having “an immutable trait that is beyond a class member’s control” is not present with same-sex couples).
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blank marriage policy (“I think, therefore I am [male/female]”). Marriage has long been
defined as the “Legal union of one man and one woman as husband and wife.”63 In the
same way that Michael Jackson remains African-American in spite of surgery or skin
bleaching, transsexuals cannot change their birth sex despite cosmetic surgery. Any
union other than the binary male and female model is not marriage. If someone can
merely think they are African-American, the law cannot permit such a person to claim
minority status. If sex is a “continuum” definable only by subjective mental ruminations,
then most of our laws (and certainly equal protection) will have no meaning.64
1. The laws of the several states do not recognize sexchange surgery to alter sex for the purpose of marriage.
a.

The majority rule.

The majority rule in America clearly holds that a transsexual may not marry
someone of the same birth sex. This majority rule has been historic international rule that
began in Great Britain.
(1)

Florida.

The Florida Court of Appeal voided the “marriage” between a
postoperative female-to male transsexual and another female under the states marriage
laws which recognize only the union of one man and one woman.65 The case involves
Margo Kantaras who was born female in Ohio. In 1986, Margo moved to Texas and
changed her name to “Michael”(hereafter “MK”), and in 1987 underwent SRS, which

63

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th Ed.).
See e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq. (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq.
(Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972 to the Equal Opportunity in Education Act dealing with equal
funding of female athletics).
65
Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155.
64
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involved testosterone treatments, a total hysterectomy and a double mastectomy.66 In
1988, MK obtained a marriage license in Florida and “married” another female by the
name of Linda, who at the time was aware of the SRS, and who also knew that MK still
retained her female vagina.67 After Linda became a Christian and informed MK that their
relationship was improper, MK filed for divorce and sought custody of Linda’s two
children. Linda filed a counter-petition claiming that the “marriage” was void under
Florida law.68 Acknowledging that Florida law explicitly limits marriage to one man and
one woman and bans same-sex marriage, the court stated the following: The controlling
issue in this case is whether, as a matter of law, the Florida statutes governing marriage
authorize a postoperative transsexual to marry in the reassigned sex. We conclude they do
not.69
The Kantaras court stated that the common meaning of “male and female . . .
refer to immutable traits determined at birth.”70 The court deferred to the legislature,
stating:
Whether advances in medical science support a change in the meaning
commonly attributed to the terms male and female as they are used in the
Florida marriage statutes is a question that raises issues of public policy
that should be addressed by the legislature. Thus, the question of whether
a postoperative transsexual is authorized to marry a member of their birth
sex is a matter for the Florida legislature and not the Florida courts to
decide. Until the Florida legislature recognizes sex-reassignment
procedures and amends the marriage statutes to clarify the marital rights of
a postoperative transsexual person, we must adhere to the common
meaning of the statutory terms and invalidate any marriage that is not

66

Id. at 155.
Id. at 155-56.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 161
70
Id.
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between persons of the opposite sex determined by their biological sex at
birth. Therefore, we hold that the marriage in this case is void ab initio.71
(2)

Kansas.

The Kansas Supreme Court found that a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual is not a woman within the meaning of the marriage statutes, and therefore,
such “marriage” is void.72 Joseph M. Gardiner, III, in the probate proceeding of Marshall
G. Gardiner, challenged the right of J’Noel Gardiner’s right to receive a spousal share of
Marshall’s estate on the grounds that the marriage was fraudulent and void, because
J’Noel remained a male and same-sex marriage in Kansas was barred by statute.73 After
reviewing domestic and international case law74, the court observed the following:
[T]he essential difference between the line of cases, including Corbett and
Littleton, that would invalidate the Gardiner marriage and the line of
cases, including M.T. and In re Kevin, that would validate it is that the
former treats a person’s sex as a matter of law and the latter treats a
person’s sex as a matter of fact.75
The court therefore stated, “We view the issue in this appeal to be one of law and not
fact. The resolution of this issue involves the interpretation of [Kansas Statutes]. The
interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and this court has unlimited appellate
review.”76 The “fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
legislature governs.” The court continued:

71

Id.
See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
73
See Id. at 122-123.
74
The English case of Corbett v. Corbett, 2 All E.R. 33 (1970) and the Texas case of Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000), refused to recognize the right of a
transsexual to marry a person whose sex was that of the transsexual’s birth sex. The case of M.T. v. J.T.,
355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. App. Div.) cert. denied, 364 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 1976) and In re Kevin, Fam.C.A.
1074 (File No. SY8136 Of. 1999, Family Court of Australia at Sydney), ruled that a transsexual may
marry a person of the transsexual’s birth sex.
75
Id. at 132-33.
76
Id. at 135.
72
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The words “sex,” “male,” and “female” are words in common usage and
understood by the general population. Black’s Law Dictionary, 1375 (6th
ed. 1999) defines “sex” as “[t]he sum of the peculiarities of structure and
function that distinguish a male from a female organism; the character of
being male or female.” Webster’s New 20th Century Dictionary (2nd ed.
1970) states the initial definition of sex as “either of the two divisions of
organisms distinguished as male or female; males or females (especially
men or women) collectively.” “Male” is defined as “designating or of the
sex that fertilizes the ovum and begets offspring; opposed to female.”
“Female” is defined as “designating or of the sex that produces ova and
bears offspring; opposed to male.”[Emphasis added]. According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, 972 (6th ed. 1999), a marriage is the legal status,
condition, or relation of one man and one woman united in law for life, or
until divorce, for the discharge to each other and the community of the
duties legally incumbent on those whose association is founded on the
distinction of sex.”77
After discussing the common understanding of the terms sex, male and female, the court
continued:
The words “sex,” “male,” and “female,” in everyday understanding do not
encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary meaning of “persons of the
opposite sex” contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and
not persons who are experiencing gender dysphoria. A female-to-male
post-operative transsexual does not fit the definition of a female. The
male organs have been removed, but the ability to “produce ova and bear
offspring” does not and never did exist. There is no womb, cervix, or
ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes. As the Littleton
court noted, the transsexual still “inhabits . . . a male body in all aspects
other than what the physicians have supplied.”78
Rejecting the argument that the absence of the word “transsexual” from the same-sex
marriage statute made the statute vague, the court declared: “We view the legislative
silence to indicate that transsexuals are not included. If the legislature intended to include
transsexuals, it could have been a simple matter to have done so.”79 The court cited to

77

Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
79
Id. at 136.
78
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Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,80 which reversed a federal district court that held that sex
included not only chromosomes, but also psychological self-perception. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeal found that “to include transsexuals within the reach of Title VII
far exceeds mere statutory interpretation.”81 Finding Ulane “well reasoned and logical”,
the court held that the legislature clearly viewed “opposite sex” in the narrow traditional
sense. . . .We cannot ignore what the legislature has declared to be the public policy of
this state. Our responsibility is to interpret [the statute] and not to rewrite it. . . .If the
legislature wishes to change public policy, it is free to do so; we are not. To conclude that
J’Noel is of the opposite sex of Marshall would require that we rewrite [the Kansas
Defense of Marriage Act].82
Thus, “J’Noel remains a transsexual, and a male for purposes of marriage under [the
Kansas DOMA]. . . . [T]he validity of J’Noel’s marriage to Marshall is a question of
public policy to be addressed by the legislature and not by this court.”83
(3)

Ohio.

Ohio does not allow a transsexual to obtain a marriage license to marry a person
of the same gender as their birth sex. In the case of In re Nash,84 Pamela Nash was born
female in Massachusetts. Nash later married a man and subsequently divorced, after
which she relocated to Ohio.85 In Ohio Nash changed her name to “Jacob Benjamin
Nash.”86 Nash then applied to change her Massachusetts birth certificate to reflect a
change in sex designation from female to male, and the request was granted, so that the
80

742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1086.
82
In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 136-37.
83
Id. at 137.
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2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App.).
85
Id. at *1.
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certificate included both the new name and male sex designation.87 Shortly thereafter,
Nash obtained an Ohio driver’s license and applied for an Ohio marriage license. During
a search of the name, the clerk learned of Nash’s prior name change, and Nash was
informed that the license would not be issued. In rejecting the transsexual marriage, the
Nash court noted that Ohio recognizes marriage only between members of the opposite
sex.88 The court noted that “any change to Ohio’s public policy concerning transsexuals
and marriage or expanding the definition of male and female . . . must come from the
legislature.”89 The court concluded that “a marriage between a post-operative female-tomale transsexual and a biological female is void as against public policy.”90
In the case of In re Ladrach,91 another Ohio court found that a post-operative
male-to-female transsexual was not permitted to marry a male. The case began with the
filing of a petition for name change by Edward Franklin, who presented himself in female
dress and explained that he intended to undergo a “transsexual surgery” later in the year.
The applicant asked the court to change his name to Elaine Francis Ladrach, and since the
statute allows name changes so long as there is no fraudulent intent to deceive creditors
or others, the court granted the request.92 After the surgery, the applicant came to the
courthouse with his “fiancé”, acknowledging on the application that he had been
previously married twice to females. The clerk refused to issue the license and the
applicant filed for declaratory relief, stating that he “considered himself a female and that
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Id.
Id.
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Id. at *5.
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Id. at *9.
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Id.
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513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Probate Ct. 1987).
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Id. at 829.
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he had undergone a ‘medical surgical procedure that resulted in the removal of the penis
and testicles and the creation of a vagina.’”93 The court noted that it is “generally
accepted that a person’s sex is determined at birth by an anatomical examination by the
birth attendant.”94 The court then concluded “that there is no authority in Ohio for the
issuance of a marriage license to consummate a marriage between a post-operative maleto-female transsexual person and a male person.”95 The court then observed:
The determination of a person’s sex in regard to his birth certificate and
marital status are legal issues and, therefore, the court must look to the
statutes. This court is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the
statutes of this state and judicial interpretations of these statutes. Since the
case at bar is apparently one of first impression in Ohio, it is this court’s
opinion that the legislature should change the statutes, if it is to be the
public policy of the state of Ohio to issue marriage licenses to postoperative transsexuals.96

93

Id. at 830.
Id. at 832.
95
Id.
96
Id. Two states recently enacted legislation that specifically prohibits changing sex or gender on birth
certificates. See Idaho Code § 39-250; Tenn. Code § 68-3-203(d). A Florida Attorney General opinion
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certificates issued to individuals who have undergone sex-reassignment surgery,” that it is “irrelevant”
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who have undergone sex reassignment surgery.” Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 076-213. Fla. Stat. § 382.016. A
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20-18-307; Cal. Health & Safety § 103430; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-2-115; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 19a-42; D.C.
Code § 7-217; Ga. Code § 31-10-23; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 338-17-7; 410 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 535/17; Ind. Code
§ 16-37-2-10; Iowa Code § 144.23; Ky. Rev. Stat. § 213.121; La. Rev. Stat. § 40:62; Md. Code § 4-214;
Mass. Gen. Laws 46 § 13(e); Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2831; Miss. Code § 41-57-21; Mo. Rev. Stat. §
193.215; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-604.1; N.J. Stat. § 26:8-40.12; N.M. Stat. § 24-14-25(D); N.C. Gen. Stat. §
130A-118(4); Or. Rev. Stat. § 432.235; Utah Code § 26-2-11; Va. Code § 32.1-269; Wis. Stat. §
69.15(4)(b). While not specified in the statute, several additional states allow for sex changes on the birth
certificate through administrative procedures. See, e.g., Kan. Admin. Reg. 28-17-20; Me. Admin. Reg. 10146 ch.2; Nev. Admin. Code ch. 440 § 130; Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.130. The statutes of several states are
vague and therefore it is unclear how these states handle a request to change sex on the birth certificate. See
e.g., Del. Code tit. 16 § 3131; Minn. Stat. § 144.218(4); Mont. Code § 50-15-204; N.H. Rev. Stat. §
126:23-a; N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 61 and 24; R.C.N.Y. Health Code § 207.01; N.D. Cent. Code § 2302.1-25; Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 1-321; 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 450.603; R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-3-21; S.C. Code §
44-63-150; S.D. Codified Laws § 34-24-51; Tex. Health & Safety Code § 191-028; Vt. Stat. tit. 18 § 5075;
W. Va. Code § 16-5-24; Wyo. Stat. § 35-1-424.
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The court also noted that there was “no laboratory documentation that the
applicant had other than male chromosomes” and therefore, the application “to
obtain a marriage license as a female person is denied.”97 Although this case was
published, the trial court never referenced this decision.
(4)

Texas.

In Littleton v. Prange,98 the Texas court found that a ceremonial “marriage”
between a man and a transsexual born as a man, who was later surgically and chemically
altered to have the physical characteristics of a woman, was not valid and thus void. The
court queried: “[C]an a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and
counseling, or is a person’s gender immutably fixed by a Creator at birth?”99 The court
began the discussion by observing the following:
In our system of government it is for the legislature, should it choose to do
so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of
marriages involving transsexuals. . . .But this court has no authority to
fashion a new law on transsexuals, or anything else. We cannot make law
when no law exists: we can only interpret the written word of our sister
branch of government, the legislature.100
The Texas court found that the matter presented a “pure question of law and must be
decided by this court.”101 The court then observed that Christie was created and born a
male and her original Texas birth certificate clearly so stated. The court acknowledged
that Christie amended the original birth certificate to change the sex and name during the
pendency of the suit, but then pointed out that the trial court’s role in considering the
petition is merely a ministerial one, which involves no fact-finding. “At the time of the
97
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birth, Christie was a male, both anatomically and genetically. The facts contained in the
original birth certificate were true and accurate, and the words contained in the amended
certificate are not binding on this court.”102 “There are some things we cannot will into
being. They just are.”103 The court therefore held “as a matter of law, that Christie
Littleton is a male. As a male, Christie cannot be married to another male. Her marriage
to Jonathan was invalid, . . .”104
(5)

New York.

New York will not recognize a transsexual “marriage.”105

In this case, the

plaintiff was a man who sought a declaration to determine the validity of a “marriage” to
another male “who appeared to be a female.”106 The two met at a house of prostitution
where, although they spent a short time together, the plaintiff did not see the defendant
unclothed or have any sexual relations. When the plaintiff, a non-commissioned officer in
the United States Army, was transferred to Fort Hood, Texas, the defendant followed
him. A few days later, the two took part in a marriage ceremony and they both returned to
the plaintiff’s apartment. Being intoxicated, the plaintiff fell asleep. He woke up early in
the morning and reached for the defendant, and upon touching him, discovered that the
defendant had male sexual organs. He immediately left the bed, “got drunk some more”
and the next day, the defendant informed the plaintiff that he intended to undergo an
operation to have the male organs removed.107 The parties continued to live together but
never had any sexual relationship. Later, the plaintiff was transferred overseas and
101

Id.
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971).
106
Id.
102

Page - 26

returned the next year. In the interim, the defendant sent numerous letters to the plaintiff
along with medical bills for hospital and surgical expenses. These expenses were paid
for by the plaintiff. When the plaintiff returned from overseas to San Francisco, he
arranged for the defendant’s release from jail on a prostitution charge, and the two later
traveled to New York for the purpose of arranging a legal divorce or separation. The
defendant told the plaintiff on this trip that he had completed a sex surgery and was now
a “woman.”108
The court found that the defendant was not a woman and that “mere removal of
the male organs would not, in and of itself, change a person into a true female.”109 The
court observed that the “law makes no provision for a ‘marriage’ between persons of the
same sex. Marriage is and always has been a contract between a man and a woman.”110
“Accordingly, the court declares that the so-called marriage ceremony in which the
plaintiff and the defendant took part . . . did not in fact or in law create a marriage
contract and that the plaintiff and defendant are not and have not ever been ‘husband and
wife’ or parties to a valid marriage.”111
In B. v. B.,112 the court reconfirmed the holding in Anonymous, finding that
marriage is between one man and one woman. The court quoted a surgeon who had
performed more than 700 sex-reassignment surgeries: “I don’t change men into women.
I transform male genitals into genitals that have a female aspect. All the rest is in the
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patient’s mind.”113 Finding that the female who underwent sex reassignment surgery to
be “male” “does not possess a normal penis, and in fact does not have a penis” and in the
same way that surgery cannot provide a man “with something resembling a normal
female sexual organ, transplanting ovaries or a womb”, the court voided the marriage.114
(6)

Federal.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,115 found
that a male-to-female transsexual is not covered by Title VII. In Ulane, a male pilot
working for Eastern Airlines underwent sex-reassignment surgery, revised his birth
certificate and the FAA certified him as a “female.” Ulane’s own physician, however,
explained “that the operation would not create a biological female in the sense that Ulane
would ‘have a uterus and ovaries and be able to bear babies.’”116 Holding that Title VII
“does not protect transsexuals,” the court rejected the district judge who wrote that sex
was more than chromosomes and should include psychological and self-perception
components. To the contrary, the appellate court stated that its responsibility was “to
interpret this congressional legislation and determine what Congress intended when it
decided to outlaw discrimination based on sex.”117 Beginning with the “maximum of
statutory construction that, unless otherwise defined, words should be given their
ordinary, common meaning,” the court found that Title VII banned discrimination based
113
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on “sex”, which “implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women because they
are women and against men because they are men.”118 A “prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual’s sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex
into which they were born.”119 “In our view, to include transsexuals within the reach of
Title VII far exceeds mere statutory interpretation. Congress had a narrow view of sex in
mind when it passed the Civil Rights Act, . . .”

120

To hold that Title VII protects

transsexuals “would take us out of the realm of interpreting and reviewing into the realm
of legislating.”121
(7)

Foreign Jurisdictions.

While briefly overviewing international law, we should remember the admonition
by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas that courts “should not impose foreign
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moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.”122 “[I]t is American conceptions of decency that
are dispositive, . . .”123 It is irrelevant how other countries interpret their laws. However, a
discussion of the international cases is presented here briefly only because the trial court
strayed into these muddy waters. What is to prevent one court from relying on the
marriage laws of Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan to support bigamy or to exclude women
from power and reduce them to property? One indictment against the King of Great
Britain in the Declaration of Independence stated: “He has combined with others to
subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws;
giving his Assent to their pretended Legislation.”124 We must not forget that important
part of American history, namely the American Revolution. If we learn anything at all
from the international cases, we should only note with a nod that the country which most
parallels our common law system is Great Britain, and the historical interpretation by
these courts have concluded that sex must be determined biologically and that a
transsexual may not marry a person whose sex is the same as the transsexual’s sex at
birth.
The first reported transsexual case in the world is Corbett v. Corbett,125 Corbett
involved a person whose sex at birth was male, but who later underwent an operation to
remove his testicles and most of the scrotum, along with an incision to create an artificial
“vagina.” Arthur Corbett met this transsexual who presented himself as a woman and the
two married. After the marriage, Mr. Corbett learned that his “wife” was actually a man.
He filed for divorce, asking the court to declare the “marriage” null and void. After
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listening to medical testimony, the court noted that there were several possible factors in
determining a person’s sex, which included (1) chromosomes; (2) gonads (the presence
or absence of testes or ovaries); (3) genitalia (including internal and external sex organs);
(4) psychological; and (5) hormonal factors or secondary sexual characteristics (such as
the distribution of hair and physique). Discussing the inherent problems with hormonal
and psychological factors, the court observed the following:
Since marriage is essentially a relationship between man and woman, the
validity of the marriage in this case depends, in my judgment, on whether
the respondent is or is not a woman. . . . Having regard to this essentially
heterosexual character of the relationship which is called marriage, the
criteria must, in my judgment, be biological, for even the most extreme
degree of transsexualism in a male or the most severe hormonal imbalance
which can exist in a person with male chromosomes, male gonads and
male genitalia cannot reproduce a person who is naturally capable of
performing the essential role of a woman in marriage. In other words, the
law should adopt, in the first place, the first three of the doctors’ criteria,
i.e., the chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests, and if all three are
congruent, determine the sex for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and
ignore any operative intervention. . . . My conclusion, therefore, is that the
respondent is not a woman for the purposes of marriage but is a biological
male and has been so since birth. It follows that the so-called marriage of
10th September 1963 is void.
The court in Corbett recognized any other decision incorporating hormonal or
biological factors would be fraught with insurmountable difficulties. The court pondered
the following questions:
If a law were to recognize the [sex surgery] “assignment” of the
respondent to the female sex, the question which would have to be
answered is, what was the respondent’s sex immediately before the
operation? If the answer is that it depends on ‘assignment’ then, if the
decision at that time was female, the respondent would be a female with
male sex organs and no female ones. If the assignment to the female sex
is made after the operation, then the operation has changed the sex. From
this it would follow that if a 50-year-old male transsexual, married and the
father of children, underwent the operation, he would then have to be
regarded in law as a female, and capable of ‘marrying’ a man! The results
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would be nothing if not bizarre. . . . Marriage is a relationship which
depends on sex and not on gender.
The holding in Corbett was reexamined and confirmed in England in the case of
Bellinger v. Bellinger.126 Until recently, the European Court of Human Rights had
routinely upheld England’s refusal to recognize the right of transsexuals to marry.127
In W. v. W.,128 the court in South Africa followed the decision in Corbett. The
court found a transsexual marriage to be invalid and stated that the “evidence does not
show that the operation converted her into a female. What it did was to artificially supply
her with certain of the attributes of a woman, namely, breasts and a vagina-like cavity. . .
. Imitation cannot be equated with actual transformation.” The court noted that in order to
recognize the right of a transsexual to marry, “intervention of the legislature would be
necessary.”129 Several Canadian courts have also followed the reasoning in Corbett.
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In B.V.A.,130 a Canadian court found that a female-to-male transsexual who had a
20-year relationship with a female was not a “spouse” within the meaning of the Family
Law Act.131 The court found that the transsexual who had undergone a hysterectomy,
mastectomy and hormonal treatments, but had not yet received an artificially constructed
penis, was not a “male” and would “revert” back to her female self once the hormone
treatments ceased.
In C.(L.) v. C.(C.),132 an Ontario court concluded that the marriage between a
female and a female-to-male post-operative transsexual was void ab initio. The court
found that the transsexual had not received an artificially created penis and thus had not
changed her sex. In M. v. M.(A),133 another Canadian court considered a case involving
two people who lived together for thirteen years, first as common-law and then as
married persons. After they separated, the female spouse began to live as a man and
started hormonal treatment, although no surgery had yet been performed. The husband
received a Decree of Nullity, even though the attempted sex change occurred after the
marriage dissolved. The court found that the wife had latent transsexual characteristics
which prohibited her from being capable of being married to a male.134
The Singapore courts have also followed the decision in Corbett. In Ying v.
Eric,135 the court considered a female who underwent sex-reassignment surgery to
become male, including a phalloplasty which involved the construction of an artificial
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“penis.” The court noted that “since the respondent’s penis was artificial, erection for
sexual intercourse was not possible.” The court found that “one’s sex is fixed at the
moment of conception” and that chromosomes should be the primary relevant factor in
determining sex. The Singapore court considered relevant law and concluded as follows:
It is desirable in the interests of certainty and consistency for the word
‘man’ under the Charter to be given the ordinary meaning that is in
contradistinction to woman. A person biologically a female with an
artificial penis, after surgery and psychologically a male, must, for
purposes of contracting a monogamous marriage of one man and one
woman, under the Charter be regarded as a ‘woman’.
The court therefore declared the marriage to be a nullity and then concluded: “A person
who has undergone a sex-change operation cannot be regarded as belonging to the sex for
which reassignment surgery was undertaken for purposes of a monogamous marriage
under the Charter.”
b.

The minority rule.

The minority rule, especially in America, includes a subjective psychological
component to the definition of “sex” or “gender.” There is only one reported case in
America that has followed this treacherous path, along with several international
decisions.136 There are no such rulings internationally among common-law countries.
(1)

New Jersey.

In M.T. v. J.T.,137 the court found that a female-to-male post-operative transsexual
was permitted to marry a person of the sex of the transsexual at birth. The essence of the
court’s decision was as follows:
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If such sex reassignment surgery is successful and the postoperative
transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment, thereby possessed of the full
capacity to function sexually as a male or female, as the case may be, we
perceive no legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason grounded in
public policy to prevent the person’s identification at least for purposes of
marriage to the sex finally indicated.138
The court found that the transsexual had physiologically become a “female” and
should be “considered a member of the female sex for marital purposes.”139 Then the
court made the astonishing statement that such “recognition will promote the individual’s
quest for inner peace and personal happiness, while in no way disserving any societal
interest, principle or public order or precept of morality.”140 The court’s decision is
obviously shortsighted without any understanding of the far-reaching ramifications.
There is certainly more at stake than a person’s “inner peace and personal happiness”;
rather, there are many societal interests at stake. Every court of last resort in America has
rejected the reasoning in the New Jersey decision.
(2)

Foreign Jurisdictions.

An Australian Family Court found that a female with typical XX chromosomes,
female genitalia and gonads, but who surgically removed these female organs, should be
considered a “man” for purposes of Australia’s marriage law.141 Instead of focusing on
birth to determine sex, the court focused instead on the time of marriage. Although
acknowledging that a transsexual is to be distinguished from someone with Klinefelter’s
Syndrome, hermaphroditism, and Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, the court
nevertheless considered that surgical removal of female gonads and genitalia was
138
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sufficient to transform a “female” into a “male.” However, this decision on appeal was
set aside by the full court of the Federal Family Court on February 21, 2003.142
In Secretary, Department of Social Security v. S.R.A.,143 a federal court in Sydney
found that for purposes of the Social Security Act, the words “woman” and “female”
included a post-operative male-to-female transsexual. The court noted that a person who
was only “psychologically” female but who had not undergone sex surgery would not be
considered a person of the desired sex.144
In Attorney-General v. Otahuhu Family Court,145 a New Zealand court found that
for purposes of the New Zealand Marriage Act of 1955, where a person had undergone
surgical and medical procedures, such a person could marry another, even though that
other person was of the same birth sex as the transsexual. The court noted that the
Marriage Act of 1955 did not “refer to man and woman or husband and wife” as a
specific union, but the court nevertheless considered marriage to be the union of one man
and one woman. In addressing where to draw the line, the court noted that in order “for a
transsexual to be eligible to marry in the sex of assignment, the end of the continuum
must have been reached and reconstructive surgery done. . . . [T]here must be as
complete a transformation as is possible before that person can qualify as a person of his
or her chosen sex for the purpose of marriage.”146 The court noted that a “preoperative
transsexual” who dresses and behaves in the assigned sex may be accepted in that sex for
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employment and social purposes, such as a driver’s license, but it would “not be
appropriate for such a person whose genitals do not correspond with the sex of
assignment to be able to marry in that sex.”147 The court realized that its reasoning was
on somewhat shaky ground when it artificially drew the line for marriage by requiring the
person to actually undergo sex surgery. Once a psychological component is considered, it
is incongruent to force a person to undergo surgery, yet this court drew the line with a
surgical scalpel.148
Although the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, upheld on
three separate occasions Great Britain’s right to deny a marriage license to a transsexual,
the court has now receded from that position and found England’s position to be in
contravention to Articles 8 (right to respect for private life) and 12 (right to marry) of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.149
Ever since the first case in America to affirm transsexual marriage in 1976, every
other court of last resort has refused to accept that a person’s sex can be changed for
purposes of marriage. Sex must be determined by objective rather than subjective
standards.

147

Id. at 617.
If a psychological component is considered important in determining a person’s sex, then one cannot
easily argue that surgery is necessary to complete the so-called sex transformation. If a psychological
component is accepted, then a person may argue for sex-change status on the basis of subjective
psychological thoughts alone, stating that it is unfair to require expensive surgical intervention. Consider
the person who may suffer from a heart condition and is unable to undergo the sex-change surgery. Will a
person who suffers from a disability and who cannot undergo sex-change surgery be told he or she cannot
change into the desired sex, when another person who is more physically and financially capable can do
so? Including a psychological component to determine sex is fraught with innumerable problems.
149
See Goodwin v. United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 18. See also Rees v. United Kingdom (1986) 9
E.H.R.R. 56 (finding that England’s denial of the right of a transsexual to marry did not violate Articles 8
or 12); Cossey v. United Kingdom (1990) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 (same) and Sheffield & Horsham v. United
Kingdom (1998) 27 E.H.R.R. 163 (same).
148

Page - 37

III.

MUTILATING

THE

BODY’S

INTERNAL

SEX

ORGANS

AND

EXTERNAL GENITALIA DOES NOT CHANGE A PERSON’S SEX.
Hormone treatment and plastic surgery does not transform a male to female nor a
female to male. If that were the case, there will be a lot of surprised females who have
undergone surgical mastectomies or hysterectomies. To even assume plastic surgery
changes sex is an insult to these women. Since surgery cannot change sex, and
“thoughts” are too amorphous to be objective, biology must be the determinate.
A.

Chromosomes Determine Sex.
The X and Y chromosomes are the biological drivers that determine sex. A

chromosome is one of the threadlike “packages” of genes and other DNA in the nucleus
of a cell. Humans have 23 pairs of chromosomes for a total of 46 total; 44 autosomes and
two sex chromosomes. Each parent contributes one chromosome to each pair, so
offspring get half of their chromosomes from their mother and half from their father.150
The egg carries the X chromosome while the sperm carries either an X or a Y.151
Unless the Y chromosome is present and properly transcribed, the child will
develop into a female.

In extremely rare cases, genetic mutations or defects cause

problems with the normal sexual development process, and the child may be born with
ambiguous genitalia (having both male and female characteristics), or, as a result of a
mutated or missing receptor gene, the newborn may have the chromosomes of one sex
but the gonads or genitalia of another.152 These conditions are commonly referred to as
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intersex.153 Another condition known as sex chromosome aneuploidies is one where there
are an abnormal number of sex chromosomes. The person may be infertile and there may
be some abnormal sexual development, but the sex is evident and is consonant with the
chromosomes. This condition is therefore not intersex.154
Some transsexual advocates claim their bodies do not match their mind’s “gender
identification”, and thus have attempted to compare themselves with intersexuals, who
suffer from a biological (rather than psychological) ambiguity with regard to their sex.155
However, a clinical definition of intersex only includes conditions in which the
phenotype, or the visible characteristics, are not classifiable as either male or female (for
example, the presence of both male and female genitalia), or chromosomal sex (e.g., XX
or XY) is not consistent with phenotypic sex.156 There is nothing in the definition of
intersex that refers to psychology. On the other hand, transsexuals are born with
chromosomal and phenotypic consistency. The “inconsistency” they claim is not
biological or physiological but psychological, referred to as gender dysphoria or gender
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birth.” According to the source, transvestites (cross-dressers) are also included in the definition of
“transgender.” Shana Brown, Sex Changes and “Opposite-Sex” Marriage: Applying the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to Compel Interstate Recognition of Transgendered Persons’ Amended Legal Sex for Marital
Purposes, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1113, 1119 (2001).
156
See Leonard Sax, How Common is Intersex? A Response to Anne Fausto-Sterling, 39 J. OF SEX
RESEARCH 174, 176 (2002). The term “intersex” is usually reserved for individuals of intermediate sexual
differentiation, who are most often sterile. See William S. Klug, Michael R. Cummings, 3d ed. ESSENTIALS
OF GENETICS 155-70 (Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle Back River, N.J. 1999).
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identity disorder (hereinafter “GID”).157 The condition of intersex precludes a diagnosis
of transsexual or any other GID.158
Intersex conditions are not as frequent as some transsexual literature may suggest.
While some cite a study that purported to determine the occurrence of intersex in the U.S.
population at around 1.7%, a sound critique of that study found that true intersexuals only
account for .0018% of the population
B.

Biological Definition Of Sex By Chromosome Testing Is Both Possible and
Realistic.
Biology can and must be the only measure of sex. The International Olympic

Committee used sex chromosome testing from 1966-2000 to verify the sex of female
athletes.159 The most basic test that is used is the Buccal smear test, which involves
staining a cell sample and evaluating it for the presence or absence of the Barr body.160
The Barr body is caused by the inactivation of one of the two X chromosomes in genetic
female (XX) cells. Genetic males (XY) do not show this Barr body since they only have
one X chromosome, which stays active.161 One problem that the Olympics Committee
157

See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL FOR MENTAL DISORDERS: DSMIV-TR, §302.85 (2000) (hereafter “DSM-IV”).
158
Id. (“The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition.”).
159
Myron
Genel,
Gender
Verification
No
More?,
available
at
http://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/cgi-bin/iowa/issues/disc/article.html?record=879 (last visited
June 29, 2006), reprinted from 5 MEDSCAPE WOMEN’S HEALTH 3 (2000). At the 1992 winter games in
Albertville, the IOC replaced sex chromatin with DNA testing methods to detect Y chromosomes,
particularly the SRY sex-determining locus on the Y chromosome. See A. Serrat and A. Garcia de
Herreros, Determination of Genetic Sex by PCR Amplification of Y-chromosome-specific Sequences, 341
LANCET 1593-94 (1993). DNA testing has been temporarily discontinued, in part, because the clothing
used in athletic competition, as well as the requirement that urine samples be given in the presence of an
observer, are sufficient methods to determine sex. See L. Elsas, R. Hayes and K. Muralidharan, Gender
Verification in the Centennial Olympic Games, 86 GA. J. MED. ASS’N, 50-54 (1997).
160
See Douglas R. Stewart, Medical Encyclopedia: Buccal Smear, available at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003414.htm (last visited June 29, 2006).
161
Canadian Academy of Sports Medicine, Position Statement: Sex Testing (Gender Verification) in Sport,
available at http://www.casm-acms.org/forms/statements//GendereVerifEng.pdf (last visited June 29,
2006).
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had with the Buccal smear was its inability to properly detect intersexuality. For instance,
Maria Patino, a female hurdler from Spain, was wrongly excluded from competition
because she failed the Buccal smear test. She had an intersex condition known as
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome.162 While she had XY chromosomes, her body lacked
the necessary receptor for the male hormone, so she developed as a woman. Because the
male hormone had no impact on her body, she did not have an unfair advantage over the
other women in the competition, and was properly considered a female.163
With advances in genetic technology, the testis determining factor, or the gene that
results in the development of a male, was isolated and determined to be the SRY gene,
which in genetic males (XY), is located on the Y chromosome.164 Karyotyping165 is
systematic while polymerase chain reaction (PCR) analysis of the SRY gene provides
information about the presence of a Y chromosome within one day.166 Since the PCR test

162

Other intersex conditions and sex chromosome aneuploidies that result in an incorrect diagnosis of sex
using the Buccal smear test are Klinefelter’s Syndrome (a male with XXY chromosomes that would be
diagnosed as a woman), 46XX males (males that are XX but have the male determining portion of the Y
chromosome inscribed on one of their X chromosomes), Gonadal Dysgenesis (women who are XY but do
not have testes), and Turner’s Syndrome (women who have an XO chromosome makeup. Since they only
have one X chromosome, the Buccal smear test would show them to be male.). See A. Carlson, When is a
Woman not a Woman?, WOMEN SPORT FITNESS, 24-29 (March 1991).
163
Canadian Academy of Sports Medicine, Position Statement: Sex Testing (Gender Verification) in Sport,
available at http://www.casm-acms.org/forms/statements/GendereVerifEng.pdf (last visited April 4, 2005).
Unlike Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia is an intersex condition that
would pass the Buccal smear test for femininity, but would confer an unfair advantage upon the athlete.
The athlete would have XX chromosomes, but the adrenal glands produce excess androgen, resulting in
masculine characteristics which would inevitably enhance strength and muscle mass. Id. Hermaphrodites
and pseudohermaphrodites may or may not pass the Buccal smear test, depending on what sex was
assigned to them and whether it corresponds with their chromosomal sex. Id.
164
XY females nearly always lack the SRY gene. In rare cases it is present but mutated. XX males have it
transcribed onto one of their X chromosomes. Studies have shown that when the gene is added to XX mice,
the sex reverses from female to male. Corinne Cotinot, et al., Molecular Genetics of Sex Determination, 20
SEMINARS IN REPROD. MED. 157 (2002) available at www.medscape.com/viewarticle/444686 (last visited
June 29, 2006).
165
Karyotyping is a photomicrograph of chromosomes arranged according to a standard classification.
http://karyotyping.tripod.com (last visited July 18, 2006).
166
C. Sultan et al., Ambiguous Genitalia in the Newborn, SEMINARS IN REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, Aug.
2002, available at MEDLINE (FirstSearch version), NLM No. 100909394. “The SRY gene has a
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is “far simpler and less expensive than previous techniques for duplicating DNA [it has]
democratized genetic research, putting it within reach of all biologists, even those with no
training in molecular biology.”167
Chromosome testing remains highly important and relevant. Genetic testing for sex
chromosome aneuploidies and intersex conditions is simple and fairly routine in the
diagnosis of these conditions. About 900 genetic tests are now being offered by
diagnostic laboratories.168
Chromosome analysis, referred to as karyotyping, involves looking directly at the
chromosomes to determine if there are any abnormalities like a chromosomal
rearrangement; and for more subtle genetic disorders, the actual DNA sequence of a
particular gene is analyzed.169 In the rare cases where there happens to be dysgenesis

fundamental role in sex determination and is believed to be the switch that initiates the testis development.
SRY is regulated by genes upstream in the sex determination pathway and exerts its function by interaction
with genes downstream in the pathway. Any deregulation of the sex pathway leads to abnormal sex
differentiation and, in some cases, to complete sex reversal. Translocations of SRY are known to be
associated with 80% of cases of 46, XX maleness. Mutations in the SRY, SOX9, SF1, and WT1 genes are
associated with 46, XY gonadal dysgenesis, as are deletions of chromosome 2q, 9p, and 10q, and
duplication of chromosome Xp21.” http://jcem.endojournals.org/cgi/content/full/85/2/483 (last visited July
18, 2006).
167
Tabitha
M.
Powledge,
The
Polymerase
Chain
Reaction,
available
at
http://opa.faseb.org/pdf/The%20Polymerase%20Chain%20Reaction.pdf (last visited June 30, 2006); see
also Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR): Replicating Millions of Copies From a Single Gene, available at
http://www.waynesword.palomar.edu/lmexer3b.htm (last visited June 30, 2006). The inventor of PCR,
Karry B. Mullis, was awarded the Noble Prize in 1993. See Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), available
at http://www.genome.gov/10000207 (last visited June 30, 2006); The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1993,
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1993/ (last visited June 30, 2006.)
168
See Francis S. Collins, A Brief Primer on Genetic Testing: World Economic Forum, January 24, 2003,
available at http://www.genome.gov/10506784 (last visited June 30, 2006). See also Denise Casey, What
Can
the
New
Gene
Tests
Tell
Us?,
available
at
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/Human_Genome/publicat/judges/judge.html (last visited June 30,
2006).
169
For example, Klinefelter’s Syndrome is diagnosed with peripheral blood karyotyping to detect an extra
X chromosome (The Medical Algorithms Project, Criteria for the Diagnosis of Klinefelter’s Syndrome,
available at http://www.medal.org/visitor/www/Active/ch43/ch43.19/ch43.19.01.aspx (last visited June 30,
2006); Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome is diagnosed by testing for mutations in the AR gene (Leonard
Pinsky, Mark A. Trifiro, GeneReviews: Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, available at
http://www.geneclinics.org/profiles/androgen/details.html (last visited June 30, 2006)); 21-hydroxylase
deficiency (the most common cause of congenital adrenal hyperplasia) is diagnosed by testing the
CYP21A2 gene for mutations or deletions (Maria I. New, Andrea Putnam, GeneReviews: 21-Hydroxylase
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between observed sexual characteristics and the results of the Buccal smear test,
specialized genetic testing can be utilized. A PCR test can be done to detect the SRY
gene. Through this process, a person’s sex can be reliably determined, even if the initial
Buccal smear does not correctly diagnose a rare condition.170
The argument that sex must include a psychological component is specious. The
few cases which do not on first blush neatly fit into one category do not undermine the
male-female paradigm any more than birth defects undermine normal human physiology.
The logic behind the argument for a “gender spectrum” stems from a desire to create a
norm from an anomaly. As already noted, transsexuals are not intersex and intersexuals
are not transsexuals. An intersex condition is an ambiguity between the chromosomes
and the gonads or genitalia. Transsexuals have harmony between the chromosomes,
gonads and genitalia, but claim a conflict between the mind and the body.171
The transsexual movement is reminiscent of cultural trends in the 1960s to
“normalize” schizophrenia by claiming schizophrenics were

victims of “psychiatric

oppression.” As a result of these efforts, thousands of mentally ill people were released
from hospitals to the streets, often becoming homeless or incarcerated.172 Anne Fausto-

Deficiency,
available
at
http://www.geneclinics.org/servlet/access?db=geneclinics&site=gt&id=8888891&key=rx1NKmeGcV253
&gry=&fcn=y&fw=jirn&filename=/profiles/cah/index.html (last visited June 30, 2006). Francis S. Collins,
A Brief Primer on Genetic Testing, available at http://www.genome.gov/10506784 (last visited June 30,
2006) (Dr. Collins is the Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute); see also
http://www.genetests.org (for a list of specific types of tests) (last visited June 30, 2006).
170
Given the small proportion of intersex in the population (.0018%), and the fact that many of these
conditions still yield a recognizable phenotype (see Appendix A), the resulting amount of people requiring
additional testing is almost unmeasurable. See Appendix B for a diagram of the testing process.
171
See DSM-IV-TR §302.85. “Individuals with Gender Identity Disorder have normal genitalia (in contrast
to the ambiguous genitalia or hypogonadism found in physical intersex conditions).” Id. at 579.
172
See Paul McHugh, Psychiatric Misadventures, Joseph Epstein and Robert Atwan, eds., THE BEST
AMERICAN ESSAYS 1993 188-91(Ticknor & Fields, New York 1993); Sax, How Common is Intersex?, 39 J.
OF SEX RESEARCH at 181.
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Sterling, the author of the study erroneously claiming intersex conditions affect 1.7% of
the population, argued that all possible combinations of sexual anatomy should be
considered normal, and that classifications of normal and abnormal sexual anatomy are
“mere social conventions, prejudices which can and should be set aside by an enlightened
intelligentsia.”173 One advocate wrote that “transsexualism [is] a socially constructed
problem created by the medical establishment . . .”174 Harry Benjamin opined that
“[i]nstead of treating the patient, might it not be wiser and more sensible to treat society. .
. ?”175

The currently fashionable movement toward “tolerance” and freedom from

“oppressive” social constraints becomes absurd when it ignores reality. Binary sex is
more than just a paradigm – it is a medical reality, and it must remain a legal reality in
order to preserve the integrity of the law.176
1.

Surgically and chemically mutilating the body to alter

sexual appearance is experimental and controversial medical
treatment.
Plastic surgery and hormone therapy may alter a person’s physical characteristics
but cannot alter the person’s sex. A woman who had a hysterectomy and mastectomy is a
woman. A woman who thinks she’s a man is a woman. Therefore, a woman who’s had a
hysterectomy and mastectomy and thinks she’s a man remains a woman.
Radical surgical procedures on male-to-female transsexuals include removal of
the penis and scrotum, bilateral orchiectomy (removal of the testicles), vaginoplasty
(creation of artificial vagina), estrogen hormone injections, and perhaps a tracheal shave
173

Sax, How Common is Intersex?, 39 J. OF SEX RESEARCH at 181.
Id.
175
Leah Cahan Schaefer and Connie Christine Wheeler, Harry Benjamin’s First Ten Cases (1938-1953): A
Clinical Historical Note, 24 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 83 (1995).
174
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(reducing the tracheal cartilage commonly called the Adam’s apple). Female-to-male
surgery includes a radical mastectomy, a total hysterectomy (removal of the uterus and
ovaries), testosterone injections, and in rare cases, an artificial construction of a penis
(phalloplasty) or enlargement of the clitoris (metaidoioplasty). Phalloplasty merely
creates an imitation penis that lacks sensitivity and will not become erect without a
stiffening device.177 Studies indicate that many who undergo a phalloplasty are unhappy
with their resulting imitation organ.178 When a patient chooses not to undergo a
phalloplasty, another surgical option is a metaidoioplasty. This technique allows the
clitoris to extend further out, and it shapes the enlarged clitoris to look more like a small
penis.179 The length of the metaidoioplasty-enlarged clitoris would still be insufficient for
intercourse.180
Hormonal treatment of the female-to-male and male-to-female transsexuals can
cause a number of dangerous side effects.181 Some research shows that female-to-male
transsexuals who have been treated with hormones for 4-5 years, but have not had a

176

Id.
See Janice Raymond, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE 160-161 (Teachers
College Press 1994) (1979).
178
See James Barrett, Psychological and Social Function Before and After Phalloplasty, 2 INT’L J.
TRANSGENDERISM 1 (1998),available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0301.htm (last visited June 30,
2006). The study notes that as few as 39% having phalloplasty are happy with result, leaving 61%
dissatisfied.
179
See Carlo Trombetta, et. al., Total Sex-Reassignment Surgery in Female-to-Male Transsexuals: a OneStage Technique, 90 BJU INT’L 754, 758 (2002).
180
Id.
181
Walter Futterweit, Endocrine Therapy of Transsexualism and Potential Complications of Long-term
Treatment, 27 ARCHIVE OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 209-18 (1998). Some complications include water and
sodium retention, increased erythopoiesis, decreased carbohydrate tolerance, decreased serum high-density
lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol, liver enzyme abnormalities occur, obesity, emotional or psychiatric
problems, and sleep apnea.
177
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hysterectomy, have developed “intrauterine complications.”182 Hormone treatment
substantially increases risk of cardiovascular disease and liver complications.183 Longterm, high-dose androgen therapy is associated with impaired vascular reactivity in
genetic females, independent of the effects of androgens on lipoprotein levels or vessel
size.184 Androgen treatment in a male-to-female transsexual can cause recurrent
myocardial infarction.185
“The number of deaths in male-to-female transsexuals was five times the number
expected, due to increased numbers of suicide and death of unknown cause.”186 Based on
a study of 303 male-to-female transsexuals undergoing estrogen hormone treatment,
pulmonary embolism, cerebral thrombosis, myocardial infarction, prostatic metaplasia,
and breast cancer were not uncommon side effects of the hormones.187
“Sex-reassignment” surgery is an experimental and likely unethical treatment
because it dramatically increases health risks while showing no objective evidence of
curing the mental disorder, gender identity disorder. A recent study revealed that major
complications can occur during, immediately and some time after sex-reassignment
surgery.188 One of the most common and gruesome risks of a male-to-female SRS is a

182

Shadow Morton et al., Notes on Gender Transition, FTM 101 – The Invisible Transsexuals (last revised
1997) available at http://www.avitale.com/FTM101.htm (last visited June 30, 2006) (ranging from fibroid
cysts, to endometriosis, to fibrous scar tissue that formed around reproductive organs).
183
Id.
184
See Robyn J. McCredie et al., Vascular Reactivity is Impaired in Genetic Females Taking High-Dose
Androgens, 32 J. AM. COL. OF CARDIOLOGY 1331-1335 (1998).
185
See Jose’ Biller, et al., Ischemic Cerebrovascular Disease and Hormone Therapy for Infertility and
Transsexualism, 45 NEUROLOGY 1611, 1612 (1995); H. Asscheman et al., Mortality and Morbidity in
Transsexual Patients with Cross-Gender Hormone Treatment, 38 METABOLISM 869 (1989).
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
S. Krege et al., Male-to-female Transsexualism: A Technique, Results and Long-term Follow-up in 66
Patients, 88 BJU INTERNATIONAL 396-402 (2001). Fourteen percent had major complications during,
immediately, and some time after, surgery. This includes “severe wound infections in six, a rectal lesion in
three, necrosis of the glans in three and necrosis of the distal urethra in one.”
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rectovaginal fistula which also includes a very high risk of infection.189 In addition, minor
complications are frequent.190 The female-to-male transsexual faces some unique
problems after a double mastectomy and/or mastopexy if they are taking testosterone
hormones.191 Therefore, because of the dangers surrounding the surgery, the validity of
the treatment should be questioned and certainly the law should not encourage it by
granting the patient a new legal sex status.
Furthermore, some patients have refuted the success of the surgical procedures.
According to a long-term follow-up of male-to-female transsexuals that underwent SRS,
30% considered retrospectively the SRS a mistake.192 In particular, there was a case
concerning a male-to-female that lived as a female for approximately two and a half
years, but the day before his SRS, the hospital stopped performing the procedure.193
Mickey was born male, but throughout his early life he felt uncomfortable with his sex
and longed to be a woman. As a result, when Mickey was 22, he applied for SRS.194 The
doctors evaluated Mickey and approved his sex-reassignment surgery.195 Mickey began
to take hormones and dress and act as a woman, and lived as a female for 2½ years.196
189

Sarah, Notes on Gender Transition: Living With a Rectovaginal Fistula (1996; editor’s note 2000)
available at http://www.avitale.com/Rectovaginal_Fistula.html. (last visited June 30, 2006) “Symptoms
include intrusion of intestinal fluids, gases and feces into the vagina, and often intestinal distress.”
190
S. Krege et al., Male-to-female Transsexualism: A Technique, Results and Long-term Follow-up in 66
patients, 88 BJU INTERNATIONAL 396-402 (2001). Thirty-six percent had meatal stenosis, i.e. the
narrowing of the urethra which can cause difficulty urinating.
191
Shadow Morton et al., Notes on Gender Transition, FTM 101 – The Invisible Transsexuals (revised
1997) available at http://www.avitale.com/FTM101.htm (last visited June 30, 2006). “With testosterone
comes body hair. The chest hair that grows in around the sutures and incisions can, at the very least, be
incredibly annoying, and in the extreme can be ingrown and even cause infection.”
192
See Gunnar Lindelmalm, M.D. et al., Long-Term Follow-Up of “Sex Change” in 13 Male-to-Female
Transsexuals, 15 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 187, 199-201 (1986).
193
See Elsie R. Shore, Ph.D, The Former Transsexual: A Case Study, 13 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR,
277, 280 (1984).
194
Id. at 278.
195
Id. at 279.
196
Id.
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Researchers report that, in fact, he was a very convincing female.197 However, a day
before he was to enter the hospital to have his genitals removed, the hospital changed its
policy and refused to perform further sex-reassignment surgeries.198 Disappointed,
Mickey continued to live as a female. Through a series of events and therapy, however,
his desire to become a woman subsided until it finally disappeared.199 Mickey fell in love
with a woman and repudiated his desire to have his genitals removed and to live as the
opposite sex. Researchers report that he now leads a happier and more stable life than he
did when living as a woman.200 Tragically, researchers also tell stories of individuals who
have the same recovery only after sex-reassignment surgery has taken place.201
In addition to the negative subjective data from patients, there is a lack of
evidence showing that SRS grants the recipient an objective advantage in social
rehabilitation.202 Instead, there have been findings that point to the “possibility of
psychosocial intervention as an alternative to surgery in the treatment of transsexuals.”203

197

Id. at 278.
Id. at 280.
199
Id. at 282.
200
Id. at 281-82.
201
See e.g. J. Money & G. Golff, Sex reassignment: Male to Female to Male, 2 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR 245-250 (1973); J. Randall, Indications for Sex Reassignment Surgery, 1 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR 153-161 (1971). Dr. Robert Spitzer, who once opposed reparative therapy (therapy with a goal
to change a person’s “sexual orientation), now acknowledges that through such therapy “some gay men and
lesbians are able to . . . change the core features of sexual orientation.” Robert L. Spitzer, Can Some Gay
Men and Lesbians Change Their Sexual Orientation? 200 Participants Reporting a Change from
Homosexual to Heterosexual Orientation, 32 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 403, 415 (2003). See also
Elaine V. Siegel, FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY: CHOICE WITHOUT VOLITION (The Analytic Press, Inc.:
Hillsdale, N.J. 1988) (reporting that more than half of the twelve woman who were referred to her for
counseling made complete transitions from homosexual to heterosexual).
202
See Jon K. Meyer, M.D. et al., Sex Reassignment: Follow-up, 36 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1015 (1979).
One follow-up study found that “adoption of the new gender role coincides with the hormonal reassignment
and therefore is long before the surgical gender reassignment.” Friedemann Pfäfflin, et al., Sex
Reassignment – Thirty Years of International Follow-up Studies After Sex Reassignment Surgery: A
Comprehensive Review, 1961-1991(translated from German into American English by Roberta B. Jacobson
and Alf B. Meier) available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/pfaefflin/1000.htm (last visited June 30,
2006) (IJT Electronic Books).
203
David H. Barlow, PhD. et al., Gender Identity Change in Transsexuals, Follow-up and Replications, 36
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1002-07 (1979). Conservatively diagnosed transsexuals received
198
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There are cases of adults with GID that persuasively display how gender dysphoria can
remit “over the years with or without treatment and in response to various life events and
comorbid psychopathology.”204 The law should not grant a new legal sex status based on
a mental condition which is subject to change or a surgical procedure that is possibly a
mistake.
The American Psychiatric Association made substantial changes to the diagnostic
classification of GID in 1994.205 “These include[d] collapsing the three diagnoses of
gender identity disorder of childhood, transsexualism, and gender identity disorder of
adolescence or adulthood, nontranssexual type, that were in the DSM-III-R into one
overarching diagnosis, gender identity disorder . . . .”206 Therefore, transsexualism is a
subsection of GID. However, unlike the DSM-III-R, the diagnosis of GID cannot be
given to persons with physical intersex conditions.207 The DSM-IV-TR makes a
distinction between individuals born with physical ambiguity (intersex), and one who is
conflicted mentally.208 The law should make a distinction as well. If the law grants a new
“sex” status for those who have been diagnosed with GID and who undergo SRS, the law
undoubtedly will be required to grant a new sex status for all individuals diagnosed with

psychosocial intervention that proved to be successful in aligning the individual’s gender identity with the
natural sex of the patient.
204
Isaac Marks et al., Adult Gender Identity Disorder Can Remit, 41 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 273-75
(2000) (“A dramatic cure of apparent transsexualism, by less than 3 hours of exorcism over two sessions,
was documented and carefully measured from 7 months before to 2 years after the exorcism.” Furthermore,
there are additional individual cases where gender dysphoria appeared with other mental illness and while
the patient was treated (often with medicine) for the latter mental illness, gender dysphoria subsided or was
completely cured. “Adult GID reportedly remitted for up to 10 years in response to sexual relationships and
other events in five cases evaluated by the second author (R.G.).”).
205
See Susan J. Bradley, M.D. et al., Gender Identity Disorder: A Review of the Past 10 Years, 36 J. AM.
ACAD. CHILD ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 872, 873 (1997).
206
Id.
207
Id. See also DSM-IV-TR §302.85, at 576, 579, 580-81.
208
See DSM-IV-TR §302.85, at 576, 579, 580-81.
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GID, even without SRS.209 There are as many opinions concerning the treatment of GID
as there are psychiatrists and psychologists.210 The lack of uniformity among the field
may be due to the rarity of the diagnosis.211 One study concluded that a variety of
interventions involving the parent and the child lowered cross-gender identification.212
There are three approaches concerning child/parent intervention: behavioral, eclectic and
analytic.213 Literature concerning the treatment of adolescents is rare, however supportive
therapy is the general approach.214 The political movement of the transsexual community
has had a profound effect on the field of counseling by causing some extreme counselors
to believe that this mental illness should be encouraged.215
Many psychiatrists oppose treating adolescence GID with irreversible measures or
even hormone administration too quickly because it may be a mistake.216 Some
psychiatrists speculate “a rapid agreement for sex reassignment would signal that the
therapist (who should maintain a neutral position) supports the patient’s desire for a sex
change.”217 Even more concerned, Dr. Paul Mc Hugh, Chairman of the Psychiatry
Department at John’s Hopkins, criticized SRS as “radical, irreversible surgeries.”218

209

If transsexualism is later declassified as a mental illness, like some are urging for pedophilia, then sex
merely becomes a fleeting transitional thought solely dependent on personal whim. Equal protection then
becomes a tangled web of meaningless prose.
210
See Bradley, et al., Gender Identity Disorder: A Review of the Past 10 Years, 36 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD
ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY at 878-79.
211
Id at 878.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 879.
215
Lynne Carroll et al., Counseling Transgendered, Transsexual, and Gender-Variant, 80 J. COUNSELING
& DEVELOP. 131 (2002) (advocating that the counselor listen, empathize, assume a “not knowing stance”,
provide a “safe zone” where “gender diversity is not only accepted but celebrated.”) (emphasis added).
216
Bernd Meyenburg, Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescence: Outcomes of Psychotherapy, 34
ADOLESCENCE 11, 11-13 (1999).
217
Id.
218
John Colapino, AS NATURE MADE HIM (2001).
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The source of GID is undetermined and therefore, any “treatment” administered
to a GID patient is experimental. Some psychologists follow an “instinctual
hypothesis.”219 For example, Dr. Pickstone-Taylor proposes that the “sole cause of GID
is ‘instinctual’ and that the pervasive cross-gender behavior of children with GID simply
reflects their ‘true predilections or interests.’”220 In contrast, Drs. Bradley and Zucker
adhere to the premise that the origin of GID is “multifactorial”.221 Those who follow the
latter model generally determine that one must look beyond biology to observe factors
such as: “the role of temperament, parental reinforcement of cross-gender behavior
during the sensitive period of gender identity formation, family dynamics, parental
psychopathology, peer relationships, and the multiple meanings that might underlie the
child’s fantasy of becoming a member of the opposite sex.”222 Although the exact source
of GID is unknown, a prospective study concluded that individuals with a
nonhomosexual preference, combined with psychopathology and dissatisfaction with
secondary sex characteristics, were more likely to function poorer postoperatively and
express more discontentment about the outcome or result SRS had on their lives.223 This
may indicate that homosexuality is an indicator of a better postoperative outcome. Thus,
there are many unanswered questions. What is clear, however, is that the law should not
jump into this morass to encourage the anomaly as the norm by giving legal marriage
status to transsexuals.

219

Simon D. Pickstone-Taylor, Children with Gender Nonconformity, 42 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND
ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 266-68 (2003).
220
Id. at 267.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
See Yolanda L.S. Smith, et al., SEX REASSIGNMENT: PREDICTORS AND OUTCOMES OF TREATMENT FOR
TRANSSEXUALS 85, 105-06 (2002).
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2.

There are many mental disorders which are either

permanent or where surgery to conform the mind to the body is
unethical.
According to the DSM-IV-TR, the diagnostic criteria for GID include a strong
persistent cross-gender identification that is manifested by persistent discomfort with the
birth sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex, and clinical
significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of
functioning.224 There are various mental disorders associated with GID as coexisting
disorders or as associated disorders.225 Children diagnosed with GID may also have as
coexisting mental disorders Separation Anxiety Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder,
and symptoms of depression.226 Adolescents with GID are especially at risk for
depression and suicidal ideation.227 Adults with GID may have anxiety and depressive
symptoms.228 Males with GID may also have a history of Transvestite Fetishism, other
paraphilias, and associated Personality Disorders.229 In addition, there are significant
social, personal, and occupational issues which may result from surgical sex changes, and
the patient may require psychotherapy or counseling.230 Major self-mutilation including
eye enucleation and amputation of limbs or genitals is also usually associated with severe
gender identity disturbances or with psychotic states.231
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Patients diagnosed with borderline personality disorder will typically manifest
self-mutilation beginning in adolescence and may continue to manifest self-mutilation for
decades.232 Self-mutilation and the act of “letting of blood” becomes a quick method of
relieving anxiety or anger.233 However, the mere fact that a behavior will relieve anxiety
or psychological distress is insufficient to justify the behavior when it involves
mutilation. Similarly, SRS is a type of bodily mutilation that is not justified merely
because some contend it will relieve psychological distress.234 Psychological distress is
not unique to GID; it is a characteristic of a mental disorder, which is defined in the
DSM-IV-TR as “a clinically important collection of symptoms (these can be behavioral
or psychological) that causes an individual distress, disability, or the increased risk of
suffering pain, disability, death, or the loss of freedom.”235 Dr. Tabin, of the National
Committee for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality, noted the danger of using the
prevention of significant psychological distress as a justification for stress-reducing
behavior by pointing out that suicide attempts would then have to be considered normal
when desired by the participants.236
There are many types of disorders of self-mutilation in which a significant level
of cognitive dissonance exists between bodily perception and reality. Theories regarding
the appropriate therapy differ. Whether it is amputating a limb or burning oneself, the
232
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proposed manner of treatment for such disorders varies widely depending on the etiology.
GID is a mental disorder. As such, GID is analogous to other self-mutilating disorders.
Cognitive dissonance between mind and body is insufficient to find SRS as the only
solution.
Self-mutilation is defined as an “act that often alleviates pathological symptoms
such as a perplexing feeling of numbness, strangeness, and unreality in regard to one’s
body, thoughts, and emotions as well as to persons and objects in the environment.”237
Among the different types of self-mutilation is genital mutilation.238 SRS is analogous to
genital mutilation.
Psychological pain is a common symptom of self-mutilation disorders, in which
individuals report that their actions help relieve psychological pain.239 Some claim that
self-injury is a means of promoting a sense of well-being and control.240 Self-mutilation
disorders are often related to life factors and clinical correlates such as childhood sexual
abuse and subsequent Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and life conditions such as the loss
of a parent, childhood illness, depression, physical abuse, parental alcoholism, or parental
marital violence.241 There is also a strong correlation between sexual abuse and GID.242
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Treatment for self-mutilating disorders includes learning to manage self-injurious
impulses and psychoanalysis.243 Specifically, self-destructive acts can be understood as
resulting from and symbolizing certain intrapsychic phantasies involving wishes, fears,
and compromises, in which

psychoanalysis provides the optimum vehicle for the

modification of the “internal self and object representations.”244 Psychotherapy is often
effective in cognitive dissonance between mind and body, like GID, which in essence is
an intrapsychic phantasy that one is a member of the opposite sex.245
Eating disorders such as anorexia nervosa and bulimia are characterized by the
co-occurrence of pathological thoughts and emotions concerning appearance, eating, and
food, leading to alterations in body composition and functioning that are the direct result
of these symptoms.246 Similar to disturbances in body image, GID is a disturbance in
gender image that often leads to alterations in body composition and appearance.247
Proposed treatments for anorexia include acute weight restoration and re-feeding as well
as individual, family, and group therapy.248 Treatments for bulimia consist mainly of
cognitive-behavioral approaches, as such treatments have been found effective.249 While
both GID and eating disorders are mental disorders in which there is a discrepancy
between one’s perceived and actual physical body, acceptable treatments for eating
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disorders consist of changing mental constructs through cognitive therapy, or changing
behavior through therapy.250 Treatment does not consist of validating the skewed body
image, no matter how much the patient may truly perceive that mental image to be
reality.251 In the same way, proper treatment for GID should focus on treating the
patient’s mind in order to develop a healthy self-concept of body through cognitive
therapy, rather than through radical surgical mutilation.
Paraphilias are a type of sexual disorder characterized by recurrent, intense sexual
urges or behaviors that are considered unusual or deviant by society.252 Such urges or
behaviors also cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational,
or other important areas of functioning.253 Likewise, GID is also a type of sexual disorder
that can be described as a recurring sexual behavior, or a mind set, that causes clinically
significant distress or impairment.254 GID should be treated as any other paraphilia by
cognitive therapy and not mutilation.
Another type of sexual disorder is sadomasochism, which is characterized by a
relation of dominance and submission, infliction of pain that is experienced as
pleasurable by both partners, deliberate humiliation of the other party, fetishistic
elements, and one or more ritualistic activities.255 In some instances, sadomasochism is
paraphiliac when it is the only way for an individual to get sexually aroused and
satisfied.256 Treatment for sadomasochism includes traditional psychoanalysis and
250
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behavior therapy techniques.257 Sadomasochism is treated as a “mental disorder,”
characterized by distress, harm, or functional impairment.258 Even though in some
instances sadomasochism may be the only means of sexual arousal in an individual,
thereby apt to cause a significant amount of psychological distress if the behavior is not
permitted, treatment entails modifying the mind and behavior instead of condoning such
activity for the sake of easing the mind and decreasing psychological distress.
Pedophilia is a sexual disorder in which adults justify having sex with children by
displacing blame onto the infants.259 Treatment for pedophilia includes negative
conditioning, cognitive-behavioral therapy, medication and hormones to decrease the sex
drive.260 In short, treatment focuses on changing the sexual urges. Pedophilia, in its
description as a “perversion,” implies that there is a “moral normative standard” from
which the perversion deviates. The question therefore remains how one defines the
normative conception of perversion. Deeply rooted in American culture and public policy
is the norm of male and female, man and woman.
As a matter of public policy, in order for consistency to prevail in our
jurisprudence, the determination of sex must be independent from the psychological
musings. An individual’s sex preference can manifest itself at different times in life:
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childhood, adolescence, or adulthood.261 If a person’s sex were determined by
psychological inclinations, sex would become variable, changing throughout the course
of life. The diagnosis of GID is itself a changing diagnosis since some children diagnosed
with GID may later in life display few, if any, symptoms.262 In fact, only a very small
number of children with GID continue to have symptoms that meet the criteria for GID in
later adolescence or adulthood.263 Most children with GID display less overt crossgender behaviors as time passes, as parental intervention increases, or as peer response
increases.264
Treatment for children diagnosed with GID focuses on secondary problems such
as depression, anxiety, and self-esteem.265 Therapeutic modalities for children with GID
are for the most part diametrically different than some forms of treatment for adults, since
children typically undergo psychosocial therapy sessions only, and the focus of treatment
is designed to instill positive identification of the child with the child’s biological sex.266
Adult males whose overt signs of GID appear later and more gradually in adulthood tend
to be more ambivalent about SRS and are also “less likely to be satisfied after
surgery.”267 There are reported cases of spontaneous remission of GID in adults who
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develop symptoms later in life.268 The inconsistency of the diagnosis of GID with the
passage of time and other variables, the mistaken confusion of sexual preference with
gender confusion, and the possibility of remission of GID underscore the dangerous use
of a psychological definition of sex as the basis for a legal definition of sex.
For transsexuals, SRS cannot serve as a bright line to determine sex. SRS is not
always the proposed treatment for GID.269 The Harry Benjamin International Association
Standards of Care for Gender Identity Disorders noted that some individuals diagnosed
with GID neither desired nor were candidates for SRS.270 A person claiming the same
cognitive dissonance between perceived and actual sex could argue that sex should be
determined solely by subjective mental thoughts. Such a person may contend that SRS is
not desired, is too expensive, or is contraindicated due to some secondary medical
condition.271 Thus, SRS cannot be deemed the threshold over which one must cross to
legally change sex. Subjective mental thoughts about sex are too amorphous to use as a
baseline to establish sex. The only line to draw must be with the biological and not the
psychological pen.
The modern approach to treatment of GID highlights the importance of cognitive
styles and nonsurgical psychological treatments, despite the earlier emphasis on SRS, as
propagated in 1966 by Harry Benjamin.272 The use of cognitive-behavioral therapy in
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treating GID is important due to the psychological etiology of GID. A 1976 study found
that gender dysphoria was caused by an excessive identification of patients with their
mothers, and the inability of these mothers to permit their sons to separate from their
mother’s bodies – resulting in an etiology of mother-infant symbiosis and absent
fathers.273 In the same vein, a study in 1992 proposed that persons with GID seemed to
have similar mental dimensions to those who suffered from chronic depressive
disorders.274 Despite 30 years of research on gender dysphoria, there is a marked lack of
research on the “broader issues of cognitive style and functioning, thought processes and
cognitive maturation as they may be related to the organization and evolution of gender
structures.”275
There are also various ethical concerns that arise in the use of SRS to treat GID.
Part of the ethical code of the helping professions is that treatment must have
beneficiance and the patient has the right to treatment with the least drastic alternative.276
Beneficiance or responsible care means that psychologists engage in actions that are
“likely to benefit others, or at least do no harm.277 A study in 1978 showed that those who
regretted having SRS shared the following characteristics in common: inadequate family
support, inadequate self-support, inappropriate physical build, and heterosexual
experience following SRS.278 A study of transsexual satisfaction in 1965 showed that
more than 33% attempted suicide post-surgery, and more than 25% appeared to have a
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schizoid or personality disorder.279 A study of male-to-female transsexuals in 1981
showed that 24% of SRS outcomes were unsatisfactory.280
Psychiatric diagnoses change over time, as evidenced by the ever-changing
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual.281 For example, multiple personality disorder was
recognized in the DSM III-R under its traditional name, but in the manual, DSM-IV and
DSM-IV-TR, it appears as disassociative identity disorder.282 Since psychiatric diagnoses
are subject to change, and since the disorder is subject to change during a person’s life, it
is precarious to rest a legal definition of sex on a constantly moving premise.
Some contend that gender identity is defined by how a person feels at any given
moment.283 The fallacy in relying on the subjective is that sex becomes merely a feeling.
Human feeling, by definition capricious, cannot be a standard upon which our judicial
system relies – sex cannot be determined by a balancing of masculine and feminine
feelings. Rather, sex must be determined by objective and immutable standards.
The problem of defining sex psychologically is best illustrated by considering
another mental disorder, known as Apotemnophilia or Body Integrity Identity Disorder
(“BIID”).284 Apotemnophiles feel that they are a disabled person trapped in a nondisabled
body (not unlike believing one is a man trapped in a woman’s body).285 Clinicians
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generally recognize this disorder as a paraphilia, or a displaced sexual desire such as
transvestism, voyeurism, pedophilia and bestiality.286
Apotemnophilia is a condition where one has an overwhelming desire to amputate
his or her own body parts for sexual purposes or be with an amputee sexually.287 Dr. Greg
Furth “is a longtime crusader for increased BIID research. He has also been trying for
many years to persuade doctors to cut off his right leg.” Id. Although a seemingly
obscure phenomenon, an entire subculture has developed that advocates and caters to
voluntary amputations. All one must do is perform a simple internet search with the term
“wannabe” (or “amputee wannabe”) for those who wish to have an amputation and
“devotee” (or “amputee devotee”) for those who wish to have sexual relations with an
amputee.288 Apotemnophilia “is a psychological condition in which the individual
requests an elective amputation. Individuals with this condition experience the persistent
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desire to have their body physically match the idealized image they have of themselves.
This desire forces individuals to deal with the paradox of losing one or more major limbs
(i.e. arm[s] or leg[s]) to become whole. In their minds, ‘Less is more’.”289 According to
researchers at Columbia University,
There are several conditions which may cause patients to seek amputation. These
include:
1. Transsexuals who usually mutilate only the genitals in order to assume the
physical appearance of the opposite sex.
2. Schizophrenics who may self-mutilate in response to voices ordering them to
do so or in response to a delusional belief that the body part is defective or bad.
3. Patients with a personality disorder, who appear to mutilate to relieve tension
or gain secondary advancement.
4. Confused patients who may injure themselves due to disinhibition, poor
judgment or perceptual difficulties.
5. Depressed patients who may mutilate themselves in a failed suicide attempt, or
as atonement for perceived sins.
6. Patients with Body Dysmorphic Disorder who seek body modification in
response to some perceived physical imperfection.
7. Patients with Factitious Disorder are so eager to enter the sick person's role that
they will intentionally produce psychological or physical symptoms.
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8. BIID patients appear to seek amputation in order to achieve their perceived
body image.290
The number of people who identify themselves as wannabes has grown
significantly in the past few years. One website boasts over 3,600 members.291 The search
returns several hundred results, and not surprisingly, most of these people are affiliated
with the transsexual movement. Some even call their desire to remove a perfectly healthy
limb transsexual in nature. For example, proponents of amputation as a “cure” insist,
much like transsexuals, that the only way to help these mentally ill people is to mutilate
their bodies to fit their minds. To date, most of the American medical community still
recognizes the amputation of a perfectly healthy limb as unethical and surgeons in the
United States will not amputate the limbs of apotemnophiliacs.292 If the state validates
the actions of the mentally ill by legally recognizing their “new” sex, the outcome of such
actions has the potential to lead to even more extreme mutilations, such as the amputation
of healthy limbs. A psychiatrist that specializes in apotemnophilia cannot guarantee that
after surgery to remove a healthy limb the urge will not come back to remove more
healthy limbs.293 Medical ethicist Arthur Caplan of the University of Pennsylvania says,
“It’s absolute utter lunacy to go along with a request to maim somebody” either sexually
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or physically.294 He states that when a person is running around convinced they want their
leg (or anything else) chopped off, they are hardly competent to make life-altering
decisions.295
The emergence of apotemnophilia creates one of the strongest arguments against
allowing SRS. Indeed, the fact that most practitioners and wannabes argue
apotemnophilia is no different than GID and amputation is like SRS

296

“undermines the

uniqueness of sex-change surgery and challenges the social value attributed to it”.297 One
sufferer of apotemnophilia explains that the desire to remove the limb becomes
uncontrollable and the realization of the limb’s removal “has become indispensable for
my happiness and peace of mind”.298 This is the same basic reason given by transsexuals
who desire to “change” their sex by mutilating their bodies.299 One man who suffered
from an amputee fetish severed his penis with a tourniquet, catheter and razor blade
following instructions obtained from the internet. He later questioned why he had wanted
to do this to himself in the first place.300 He became even more depressed after the
amputation than he was to begin with and cried when he spoke of what he had done.301
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The man who severed his penis was lucky compared to the man who made the
only reported case to date in this country dealing with apotemnophilia.302 The latter did
not live to shed tears about his decision. Gregg Furth and Philip Bondy, sufferers of
apotemnophilia, each made an appointment to have a leg amputated with an underground
surgeon in San Diego known unaffectionately among the transsexual crowd as “Butcher
Brown”.

Dr. John Ronald Brown agreed to the operations as long as they were

performed in Mexico. Although Mr. Furth eventually backed out of the operation after
seeing an assistant with a large knife, Philip Bondy, a 79-year-old man, decided to go
through with the leg amputation.

Bondy returned to California minus one leg and

checked into a motel where he died shortly thereafter of gas gangrene. At the trial, Dr.
Brown was found guilty of unlawful practice of medicine and convicted of second degree
murder.303 The appellate court affirmed the decision.304
Regrettable trends in the psychiatric field such as transsexualism and
apotemnophilia are not uncommon. The reality of performing these mutilating surgeries
“did not derive from critical reasoning or thoughtful assessments” on this mental
illness.305 When it follows cultural fashion, the practice of psychiatry can result in “false,
even disastrous, consequences.”306 There have been huge glitches in psychiatric history
that provide evidence as to why psychiatry should not follow cultural trends. With respect
to transsexualism and apotemnophilia, history is repeating the blunder culturally
302

See People v. Brown, 91 Cal.App.4th 256 (2001).
Id at 259.
304
Id. at 268.
305
See McHugh, Psychiatric Misadventures at 194. “The zeal for this sex-change surgery – perhaps, with
the exception of frontal lobotomy, the most radical therapy ever encouraged by twentieth century
psychiatrists – did not derive from critical reasoning or thoughtful assessments.” Id.
306
Id. at 188. When a new hysteria arises in popular culture such as the need to release schizophrenics from
the oppression of hospitals and free them from psychiatry altogether so they could live their “alternative”
303
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motivated psychiatric fads had on schizophrenics.307 When the “anti-psychiatrists”
convinced the government and society that the schizophrenics were simply
misunderstood beings living an alternative lifestyle that needed to escape the oppressive
bounds of mental hospitals, they did so under a guise of freedom. They had to convince
others it was the social custom that was oppressive. In other words, the schizophrenics
were fine. The culture merely needed to accept their alternate lifestyles. Some argued that
schizophrenics were created by outdated and nonprogressive cultural norms.308 Contrary
to what those advocating “freedom” predicted, the mentally ill did not function in society;
they suffered greatly as a result of this innovative idea.309 It became evident that
schizophrenics really were sick and incapable of functioning in society after most of them
ended up homeless.

Similarly, there are contemporary efforts to declassify

transsexualism as a mental disorder and to transform society into acceptance rather than
treating the disorder.310
According to one medical ethicist, if the apotemnophiliac movement were to
become accepted, as its sister disorder transsexualism is becoming, the law would in fact
view voluntary amputation the same as some advocates want the law to view SRS.311
Professor Mason opined that “as long as you say that people can have a sex change for
lifestyles in the 60’s or the therapy-induced “remembrance” of sexual abuse that allegedly caused so many
cases of Multiple Personality Disorder in the 90’s, disaster has inevitably followed. See id. at 187-202.
307
See id. at 187-202. “This interrelationship of cultural antinomianism and a psychiatric misplaced
emphasis is seen at its grimmest in the practice known as sex reassignment surgery.” Id. at 192.
308
Id. at 187-91.
309
Id. at 498-99.
310
Lynne Carroll, Counseling Transgendered, Transsexual and Gender Variant Clients, 80 J. COUNS. &
DEV. 134 (2002) (“We believe clinicians need to rethink their assumptions about gender, sexuality, and
sexual orientation and to adopt a “trans-positive” or “trans-affirmative” disposition to counseling. A transaffirmative approach necessitates that counselors affirm transgendered persons; advocate for political,
social, economic rights for the transgendered; and educate others about such issues”).
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what is a severe psychological disease then it is difficult to say you cannot have an
amputation for this form of severe psychological disease.”312 Conferring legal status upon
transsexuals opens a Pandora’s box which will undermine not only equal protection, but
objective law itself.
CONCLUSION
From founding of the country to the present, the public policy, as reflected in the
common and statutory law, recognizes marriage exclusively between one man and one
woman. For purposes of marriage, sex has always been assumed to be binary – male and
female.

Sex, like race, is an immutable characteristic. However, some transsexual

advocates argue that sex should not be considered static. They argue that sex should not
be determined by objective factors such as biology or physiology but by subjective
mental desires. This line of reasoning is fraught with problems.
If sex is primarily a state of mind which is subject to change over time, then equal
protection for sex-based classifications becomes meaningless. To have any meaning at
all, sex must continue to be immutable under the law. Sex must be determined by
objective factors based on biology and physiology. While plastic surgery may alter a
person’s physical appearance, it does not change a person’s birth sex.

SRS is

controversial and cannot be the bright line determinate of a person’s sex. If sex were
determined primarily by subjective mental musings, then an argument could be made that
SRS is not necessary. What should the law do with a transsexual who, after undergoing
SRS, decides to revert back to the original birth sex? Moreover, what should the law do
with a person suffering from GID when the desire to be the opposite sex remits or
311

See Seenan, Healthy Limbs Cut Off at Patient’s Request, (February 1, 2000) available at
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disappears? If the law recognized that sex is subjective, a person could be born one sex,
later acknowledged by the law to become another, and then again later determined by law
to revert to the original sex. Such a result is absolutely absurd. Sex can, and must, be
determined by objective biological and physiological factors. The law cannot base a
person’s sex upon subjective mental thoughts.

APPENDIX A
Intersex Conditions
Disorder

Chromosomes

Features

Sex

Testing

Androgen

XY

Lacks the androgen

Female

PCR test will

Insensitivity

receptor gene, so develops

discover a

Syndrome

as a female may or may

lack of SRY

not have testes

gene or a
mutation of
it

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,237010,00.html (last visited June 30, 2006).
312
Id.
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Partial Androgen XY

Androgen receptor there,

Probably

Insensitivity

but doesn’t function

female but

Syndrome

properly ambiguous

depends

PCR test

genitalia
Congenital

XX

Blockage in adrenal

Sometimes

PCR test on

Adrenal

pathway causing

genitalia

X

Hyperplasia

overproduction of

appear more

chromosome

androgen masculinization

male,

*Progestin

of a female child in utero

sometimes

Induced

ambiguous genitalia

not-

Virilization has

depends

similar effects,
but was caused
by the drug
progestin,
administered in
the 50s and 60s
to prevent
miscarriage - no
longer used
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Gonadal

XY

dysgenesis

Have mutations or

Female

PCR test

?

Peripheral

deletions of the SRY
gene, born as normal
females but do not have
secondary sex
characteristics, do not
menstruate

Mosaicism

XY/XX

Some cells contain XY
chromosomes and some

blood

cells contain XX

karyotyping,

chromosomes, results in

testicular

ambiguous genitalia

biopsy with
karyotyping.
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Sex Chromosome Aneuploidies

Disorder

Chromosomes

Features

Sex

Testing

Klinefelter’s

XXY

Overwhelmingly male,

Male

Blood

Syndrome

though most of the time

karyotyping to

sterile and there may be

detect the extra

some female breast

X chromosome

development. Many
men with KS are never
diagnosed .
Turner’s

XO

Syndrome

Female, sometimes have

Female

Blood

a webbed neck,

karyotyping to

generally will not

detect lack of

develop breasts or grow

second X

to normal height unless

chromosome

given hormone therapy,
infertility but can carry a
child
Triple X

XXX

Sometimes lower
intelligence

Page - 72

Female

Blood
karyotyping

XYY

Above average height,

Male

sometimes lower

Blood
karyotyping

intelligence

Other
Neither intersex nor aneuploidies, but some have erroneously categorized as intersex.

Disorder

Chromosome

Features

Sex

Testing

Late Onset

Can happen

Normal XY males at

XY- male

PCR test on X

Congenital

either to XY or

birth - main symptom

XX-female

chromosome

Adrenal

XX

is scalp hair thinning

Hyperplasia
Normal XX female at
birth - symptoms can
be infertility, acne,
sometimes mild
clitoromegaly
(enlarging of clitoris),
but many affected are
asymptomatic

Page - 73

Vaginal

XX

Agenesis

Normal ovaries,

Female

Physical exam

Male

Physical exam

uterus, but third
portion of vagina
failed to develop and
was replaced by
fibrous tissue. Is
corrected by surgery.

Hypospadias

XY

Urethra located at
base of penis, some
have chordee
(bending of penis
with erection)
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